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RESOLVING CLAIMS WHEN COUNTRIES DISINTEGRATE: THE
CHALLENGE OF KOSOVO
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Final status for Kosovo I must be accompanied by mechanisms for re-
solving claims by and against Kosovo and persons operating within its
territory. When states break up, as in the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugo-
slavia, and East Timor, the international legal, political, and economic sys-
tems must deal with conflicting claims by and against the elements of the
preexisting state. 2 Who is entitled to a bank account maintained by the
former state of Yugoslavia in New York: Serbia-Montenegro? Croatia?
Slovenia? Who is responsible for a debt of a socially-owned enterprise
("SOE") located in Kosovo? Serbia-Montenegro? The purchaser of the
assets of the SOE in a privatization sale? The privatization agency? Are the
debts of the former Yugoslavia to be allocated in the same way as claims
on its assets?
Some but not all of the same issues arise when the former government
of a state is displaced by revolution or by the international community, as
in Afghanistan or Iraq. 3 Is the new government responsible for all the debts
of the old regime? Are elements of the old regime or nominally private
persons or entities enjoying franchises under the old regime entitled to
* Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology. The author appreciates good research, analysis, and drafting assistance from Brian Orr, Class of
2004, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author also appreciates attorney William Klawonn's legal
insights, including identifying for the author the importance of a claims resolution mechanism to suc-
cessful final status negotiations for Kosovo. The author welcomes comments and suggestions on this
Article. He may be contacted at (312) 906-5098 or hperritt@kentlaw.edu.
1. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo, formerly an autonomous province of
the Republic of Serbia within Yugoslavia, is being administered by the U.N. as a political trusteeship.
See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 Ith mtg., U.N. Doc. S!RES/1244 (1999). See generally
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 385 (2003) (explaining the concept of political trusteeship). Security Council Resolution
1244 requires the U.N. to facilitate "a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status."
S.C. Res. 1244, supra, 1 (e).
2. See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern Law
and Policy, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 355 (2001) (reviewing public international law on state succession;
analyzing how public international law has been affected by the dissolutions of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; and recommending approaches for the future).
3. See Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (distin-
guishing state succession from mere change in government).
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some of the assets, on the grounds that they were personal and not govern-
mental in character? 4 Public international law provides only scant guidance
for resolving these questions.
Part I of this Article discusses the categories of claims, the dispute
resolution mechanisms, and the private international law concepts devel-
oped in other contexts that may be useful in deciding the final status of
Kosovo. Part I addresses the legal concepts, tools, and frameworks avail-
able that may provide insight for resolving claims in Kosovo. In Part III,
this Article surveys frameworks used in other situations with features simi-
lar to those present in Kosovo. Part IV discusses the need for any claims
resolution system to have the power to extinguish preexising rights. Part V
describes the unique situation in Kosovo, including problems with claims
dispute mechanisms already in place and common criticisms of the proce-
dures currently being followed. Part VI then offers several scenarios that
might reduce the potential of claims disputes to block successful negotia-
tions over final status for Kosovo. In order to frame the claims resolution
issues, the Article assumes an independent Kosovo. Final status other than
independence, such as defining an autonomous Kosovo within the Union of
Serbia and Montenegro or within a separate state of Serbia, presents fewer
claims resolution challenges because an overarching legal system would
already exist within which claims could be resolved.
I. UNIVERSE OF CLAIMS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION MACHINERY, AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES
Any policy analysis of claims affecting the future status of Kosovo in-
volves three overlapping tasks: categorizing claims, identifying institu-
tional mechanisms for resolving disputes over claims, and crystallizing
questions of private international law (conflict of laws) to know what
sources of substantive law, what tribunals, and what enforcement mecha-
nisms are available to decide claims disputes.
A. Categories of Claims
Claims relating to Kosovo fall into two broad categories: intergov-
ernmental claims and private claims. Intergovernmental claims include
4. See Republic of the Philippines v, Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352, 354 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming
injunction against disposing of assets in the U.S. until the Philippines Commission can determine
whether they were bought with money misappropriated from the Philippines Government and finding
federal question jurisdiction because the court must decide as a matter of federal law the effect to be
given a foreign act of state); Republic of the Phillipines v. Marcos, 653 F. Supp. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (appointing receiver over assets in US. allegedly bought with money misappropriated from the
Phillipines Government until legal proceedings in the Phillipines can determine the merits).
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claims by the state of Serbia, a possible new state of Kosovo, and third
states to physical assets and to intangibles (such as currency and gold re-
serves), regardless of where they are located. Intergovernmental claims also
include claims by international organizations such as the World Bank for
repayment of loans.
A useful analytical framework for evaluating mechanisms for claims
resolution must accommodate differences along two dimensions: a sover-
eignty dimension and a public-private dimension. The first dimension in-
volves disputes over where sovereignty resides. In some cases, such as
Cuba in 1958, or Afghanistan or Iraq in 2002-2004, state boundaries re-
main intact, but one government is supplanted by another, which seeks to
exercise sovereign power in a way that affects ownership or other claims to
property. In other cases, such as the breakup of the Soviet Union, a preex-
isting state dissolves, but a part of the territory enjoys the status of "surviv-
ing state." In the most difficult case, a preexisting state, such as
Yugoslavia, dissolves, and there is no entity entitled to the status of surviv-
ing state.
The second dimension concerns the characterization of an entity obli-
gated on a claim or asserting rights to assets. In some cases, a creditor or
debtor may unambiguously be a state. At the opposite pole, a creditor or
debtor may unambiguously be a private person-natural or legal, such as a
corporation. A number of intermediate possibilities exist, such as national-
ized enterprises, SOEs in the former Yugoslavia, and enterprises formerly
owned by the state but that had been privatized in whole or in part.
Private claims fall into three overlapping categories: claims by natural
persons to real property; employment-related claims, as for unpaid wages,
termination pay, or pension benefits; and commercial claims, as by owners
of equity interests in enterprises or claims by creditors of enterprises. In
some cases, the alleged obligor on private claims is a state or quasi-public
entity. In other cases, the alleged obligor is another private person, natural
or juridical.
Mechanisms for claims dispute resolution must encompass all of the
relevant permutations:
1. a state asset holder's relations with a state claimant,
2. a state asset holder's relations with a private claimant,
3. a private asset holder's relations with a state claimant, and
4. a private asset holder's relations with a private claimant in
conditions in which the power to change legal relations is
clouded by changes in sovereignty.
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Most of the literature on state succession focuses on the first permuta-
tion, and, indeed public international law concerns itself with only that
permutation. The fourth permutation has often been ignored, presumably
on the basis that it involves private law only, and is a matter for national
courts. But in the case of Kosovo, all four permutations must be addressed.
B. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Most scholarly attention to successorship has focused on the resolu-
tion of intergovernmental claims because there is no permanent, compre-
hensive mechanism for resolving such claims in the international public
law system. Conversely, a variety of legal systems already exist for resolv-
ing private claims, including the national legal systems of the surviving
states, the national legal systems of third states in which assets may be
located or where creditors may be citizens, and international private arbitra-
tion under the New York Convention.5
In the case of Kosovo, policymakers and lawyers should focus atten-
tion on mechanisms for resolving disputes over private claims as well as
intergovernmental claims. Presumably, whatever final status is determined
for Kosovo, both Kosovar and Serbian claimants could file claims in the
domestic courts of Kosovo, the domestic courts of Serbia, or the domestic
courts of third states. This approach is unlikely to be acceptable, however,
because of likely mistrust by Kosovars of the domestic courts in Serbia 6
and mistrust by Serbs of the domestic courts in Kosovo. Whether the do-
mestic courts of third countries are perceived as fair depends substantially
on what substantive law they apply, an issue that implicates questions of
private international law considered in the next section.
Likely mistrust of the neutrality of conventional judicial institutions
for claim resolution suggests consideration of specialized claims resolution
tribunals accompanied by procedures and personnel appointment processes
that assure neutrality. Following sections of this Article consider various
models that should be considered.
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. Most relevant states are parties to the
New York Convention.
6. The acceptability of claims dispute resolution in the courts of Serbia could be increased by the
possibility of appealling decisions in which the procedure failed to meet the standards of the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). "Any person" has standing to challenge in the European
Court of Human Rights a decision by a court in a state signatory to the ECHR. See Protocol No. 11 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the
Control Machinery Established Thereby, Nov. 5, 1994, art. 34 Europ. T.S. No. 155. The ECHR was
signed by the Member States of the Council of Europe, including Serbia and Montegro. Id. at 2; see
also http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About-Coe/Member-states/default.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2005)
(listing Serbia-Montenegro as a Member State of the Council of Europe).
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C. Private International Law
Any mechanisms for resolving private claims disputes must address
the three traditional subjects encompassed by private international law:
choice of substantive law to be applied to a case; adjudicative jurisdiction
(the power of a particular tribunal over the parties to a particular dispute);
7
and enforcement of tribunal decisions, especially enforcement by the courts
of states in which assets belonging to a judgment debtor may be located.
Choice of law is a complex and-in the United States, at least-
substantially indeterminate legal regime. Nevertheless, some basic rules of
thumb, common to most choice of law regimes, are helpful in designing
claims dispute resolution systems. First, in a dispute over real property, the
law of the place where the property is located usually is applied.8 Second,
in employment disputes, the law of the place where the workplace is lo-
cated usually is applied. 9 Third, in contract disputes, explicit choice of law
provisions in the contract usually are enforced.' 0 In the absence of such
choice of law provisions, adjudicative forums usually apply either the law
of the place of performance of the contract or the law of the place where
the contract was made.'
1
Uncertainties with respect to adjudicative jurisdiction can be reduced
by ensuring that any tribunals intended to be available for resolution of
claims related to Kosovo are fair and fully accessible to claimants, and that
their organic statutes or regulations give them exclusive jurisdiction over
such claims. Such features increase the likelihood that the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens, discussed in Part VI(A)(1 1), will steer claims to the
preferred tribunals, and that the doctrine of lis pendens will give priority to
the preferred tribunals if claims are filed there first.
The same features that reduce uncertainty with respect to adjudicative
jurisdiction will increase the likelihood that decisions by the preferred tri-
7. See generally Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
(replacing Brussels and Lugano Conventions).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 222-43 (1971).
9. Id. § 196 (contracts for the performance of services, giving employment as example).
10. Id. § 187.
11. See Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations art. 4, 1998
O.J. (C 27) 34, 37 (applicable law in the absence of choice). On January 14, 2003, the European Com-
mission ("EC") adopted a Green Paper to launch a discussion about conversion of the Rome Conven-
tion of 1980 into European legislation harmonizing choice of law in contract disputes. Although the
rules of the Rome Convention are in force in all the member states, it still takes the form of an interna-
tional agreement rather than a community instrument proper, and as such the Court of Justice of the
European Communities has no jurisdiction to interpret it. See Proposal Put Forward by European Com-
mission, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/fsj/civil/applicable-law/fsj-civil-applicable-law-
_en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
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bunals will be effectively enforced by courts in places where judgment-
debtor assets are located.
Nevertheless, residual uncertainty is inescapable because the source of
private international law for any specific case is the law of the forum. 12 An
external sovereign, in the absence of a treaty mechanism, cannot determine
absolutely what choice of law, adjudicative jurisdiction, or judgment en-
forcement rules will be applied by a court in another legal system.' 3
II. LEGAL CONCEPTS, TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS
A. Elemental Concepts
Claims incident to the dissolution of a state are similar to those arising
in the context of other legal relationships, but the conflict of laws problems
are more serious when states are involved. When the dissolving state is
solvent at the time of dissolution, the situation resembles probate of a will,
severance and partition of a joint tenancy, or a corporate division such as a
spin-off.14 When a will is probated, claimants may be sad that the decedent
no longer exists, but their wealth may increase. The challenge for the legal
system involves marshalling of assets, valuation, notifying debtors, and
distribution according to rules set by the will. Distribution is shaped by the
requirements of one legal system for the interpretation of the will and for
forced shares of certain privileged descendants. In the severance of a joint
tenancy and partition of the resulting tenancy in common, 15 claimant assets
are not increased, but they are not diminished either. Equitable distribution
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 8, § 6.
13. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482 (1987) (noting some variation in whether choice of law by a foreign court is the basis for nonrec-
ognition ofjudgment of that court),
14. See Lawrence B. Low et al, Divisive Corporate Reorganizations: Spin-offs and Subsidiary
Public Offerings, in LAWRENCE LEDERMAN & MARTIN NUSSBAUM, ACQUISITIONS IN A
DELEVERAGING ENVIRONMENT 125, 128-31 (PLI Handbook Series. No. B-787, 1992) (defining a
"spin-off' as occurring:
when a parent corporation forms a subsidiary corporation, transfers certain of its assets to the
subsidiary in exchange for all of the subsidiary's stock and distributes the subsidiary's stock
to its own shareholders pro rata as a dividend and/or sells stock in a public offering. Follow-
ing a spin-off reorganization, shareholders of the former parent corporation own stock in two
corporations which are brother-sister, rather than parent-subsidiary corporations
and distinguishing "split-off' and "split-up").
15. Professor Helmholz describes:
Joint tenancies and tenancies in common exist where estates in land or rights to chattels are
held as a unit by two or more persons. The former are distinguished from the latter by the
characteristic, traditionally called the ius accrescendi, which makes the joint tenant who sur-
vives the death of the other(s) the outright owner of all the property.
R.H. Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance ofJoint Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. I, 4
(1998).
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is the standard, but most cases involve the comparatively simple reality that
land is located in only one state, whose local law is applied to the
partition. 16
When the dissolving state is insolvent, not all the claimants can be sat-
isfied, and the problem resembles bankruptcy or equity receivership, 17 with
the added complexity that multiple legal systems are involved. In a bank-
ruptcy, assets are insufficient to satisfy all claims, and there often are mul-
tiple, conflicting claims to the same assets. Once the bankruptcy is
complete, claimants have fewer assets than they did before the
bankruptcy. 18
Any model for apportionment of claims and assets must include a
mechanism for resolving disputes over valuation 19 and distribution.
B. Legal Frameworks for State Succession
Public international law provides only scant guidance for resolving
claims when states break up. Until 1989, when the Soviet Union broke up,
the customary international law doctrine of state succession focused mainly
on treaty continuity and membership in international organizations, and not
much on succession to debts and assets.20 Among other things, this was due
to the fact that most instances of state succession until 1989 involved de-
colonization where most of the assets and debts were clearly under the
control of the colonial power.2 1 Natural resources located in the former
colonies did present issues, however.
16. See Flood v. Kalinyaprak, 84 P.3d 27, 32 (Mont. 2004). When partitioning a tenancy in com-
mon, assets are presumed to be divided equally, but evidence of unequal contribution requires property
to be divided in proportion to contribution. Id.
17. See Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U.S. 352 (1889) (discussing basic character-
istics of equity receivership); David L. Abney, The Practitioner's Corner: Selling Equity Receivership
Property Free and Clear of Liens and Encumbrances, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 364 (1988) (providing an
overview of equity receiverships, citing authority, and noting the flexibility and power to sell property
free of liens and encumbrances, which must be asserted against proceeds of the sale).
18. For example, a creditor of the enterprise would value a debt from the enterprise at full value
on the creditor's balance sheet. After bankruptcy, the balance sheet of the creditor would show only the
value of whatever the creditor received in distribution of assets of the bankrupt.
19. See In re Zell, 284 B.R. 569 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002) (determining valuation method in Chapter
7 bankruptcy proceeding); Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 93 F. Stipp. 2d 236, 256 (D. Conn. 2000) (ad-
dressing valuation dispute in spin-oft); Lance v- Lance, 979 S.W.2d 245, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing and remanding for valuation of assets involved in joint tenancy); In re Estate of Daniels, 279
Cal. Rptr. 40, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing probate court decision because of error in valuation).
20. See Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 360. Public international law, despite a long history of
dealing with treaty continuity and membership in international organizations, gives scant precedent
regarding state succession to debts and assets, due in part to the relatively recent development of the
international financial system and arrangements for multilateral lending. Id.
21. See Marco A. Martins, An Alternative Approach to the International Law of State Succession:
Lex Naturae and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1019 (1993) (characterizing the
history of the law of state succession as rooted in decolonization).
20051
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In discussions in the U.N. General Assembly beginning in 1981, for-
mer colonies asserted indefeasible claims to their natural resources. The
International Law Commission drafted some preparatory documents, and a
diplomatic conference authorized by the General Assembly produced the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts in 1983 ("1983 Vienna Convention"). 22 The 1983 Vi-
enna Convention, which has not entered into effect because it has not ob-
tained the requisite fifteen ratifications, failed to resolve many important
questions arising in the dissolution of states, as in the cases of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, 23 and East Timor. For example, the treaty failed to
distinguish between territorial and national assets. 24 It did not require any
proportionality between assumption of claims and assets. 25 It did not pro-
vide for any ongoing dispute resolution machinery. In the main, it provided
for claims to be resolved by international agreement and provided only a
general framework of default rules.
Customary international law with respect to state succession distin-
guishes between continuation and dissolution:
In the case of continuation, one or more sub-state entities breaks away
from the predecessor state and forms an independent state. What remains
of the predecessor state is referred to as the continuing state ... and is
deemed to continue the international legal personality of the predecessor
states. The break-away states are referred to as successor states or newly
independent states.
In the case of dissolution, the predeccssor state dissolves into a number
of independent states, with none of these states considered the continuing
state. All of the emerging states are considered successor states and are
treated as equal heirs to the rights and obligations of the predecessor
state.
2 6
The 1983 Vienna Convention did not distinguish between continua-
tion and dissolution, although it did distinguish between newly independent
22. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts, Apr. 8, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 306, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/tresufra.htm [hereinaf-
ter 1983 Vienna Convention].
23. See Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (observ-
ing that, absent acceptance, a successor state is not bound by contracts executed by a former sovereign,
and rejecting a claim to equitable apportionment as a nonjusticiable political question).
24. See Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 361. The 1983 Vienna Convention did not distinguish
between national and territorial debt, but it did distinguish bctwcen national and territorial assets.
Territorial assets are those things, such as power plants, manufacturing enterprises, and mineral deposits
that are linked to the physical territory of a particular successor state. National assets are "held by the
former central government, and include things such as currency accounts, federal movable property,
gold reserves, and diplomatic and state property located abroad." Id.
25. Id. at 357. Equitable allocation can be defined in terms of gross national product, natural
resources, territory, population, or some combination, but the main issue is whether a successor state's
share of assets is the same as its share of debts. Id.
26. Id. at 362.
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states, separation of part or parts of the territory of a state, and dissolution
of a state. 27 Under customary international law, the continuation case left
the assets with the continuing state, a practice derived from decolonization,
where the national property did not come within the sovereignty of the
successor state.
2 8
But in the case of dissolution, the predecessor state, having lost its in-
ternational legal personality, is no longer competent to own property 29 and,
thus, state property must devolve to successor states. 30 But the legal posi-
tion of successor states depended on whether they were recognized as
states.
31
Because the 1983 Vienna Convention has not entered into effect, cus-
tomary international law, informed by commentary arising from negotia-
tion of the 1983 Vienna Convention, provides the principal legal
framework for resolving state succession issues involving debts and assets.
But this legal environment also is indeterminate and incomplete, primarily
because public international law focuses only on the relationships among
states.32 The 1983 Vienna Convention defined state property as "property,
rights and interests ... owned by that state." 33 State debts are defined as
"any financial obligation.., towards another State, an international organi-
zation or any other subject of international law."
34
The treaty framework contemplated by the 1983 Vienna Convention
also is incomplete in that it fails to implement a freeze or standstill to pre-
serve assets.
35
Williams and Harris draw the following principles from state practice
after the end of the Cold War: first, a distinction should be drawn between
27. Id.
28. Id. at 364.
29. See id. at 388. On July 4, 1992, the EC Arbitration Commission found that the Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia C'SFRY") should be considered to have dissolved and that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") could not be considered the continuity of the SFRY. Id.
30. Id. at 364.
31. Id. Whether third-party states were obligated to recognize successor state claims to assets
depended on whether third-party states had recognized successor states as sovereign. Id.
32. See id. at 357. The three most important categories of norms relate to the identification of
national, territorial, and identifiable debt, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the principle of
equitable allocation. Id.
33. 1983 Vienna Convention, supra note 22, at art. 8.
34. Id at art. 33.
35. See Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 366. The 1983 Vienna Convention creates no obliga-
tion of third-party states to protect assets of predecessor states during the breakup or to assist successor
states in obtaining equitable shares of either territorial or national property. Id. Serbia-Montenegro was
able to seize most of the national assets of the former Yugoslavia. Id. at 399. The eventual freeze of
assets of the former Yugoslavia occurred after most were dissipated in order to finance Serbia's armed
conflict in Croatia and Bosnia. Id.
2005]
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national and territorial debts; 36 second, the principle ofpacta sunt servanda
should govern debt obligations; 37 third, the proportion of territorial debt
can be used as a basis for allocating national debt; 38 and finally, population
and economic indicators can determine the share of national debt.
39
Whatever guidance the 1983 Vienna Convention or customary inter-
national law may give for adjusting debts owed by dissolving states to
other states and for allocating assets held by other states among the compo-
nents of dissolving states, neither offers theoretical guidance for claims by
private persons against dissolving states and assets owned by dissolving
states but held by private entities. Those private sector issues are rather the
province of informal arrangements in the financial community, such as the
Paris Club40 and the London Club, 4' or by specialized mechanisms estab-
lished by bilateral agreement, such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
42
C. Legal Frameworks for Private Claims
Legal regimes for resolving private claims associated with dissolution
of states are fragmentary and incomplete. This is due, in part, to the tradi-
tional limitation of customary international law to relations among states,
and to the conventional belief that private claims can be resolved by na-
tional legal systems of the debtor or creditor states according to private
international law principles for adjudicative jurisdiction, judgment recogni-
tion and enforcement, and choice of law.
43
Private claim resolution has been addressed in international law in the
context of transnational investment disputes, including expropriation and
privatization, and in bilateral U.S. treaties providing for comprehensive
claims dispute resolution in the cases of Russia, Korea, Vietnam, and Iran.
Privatization can have a significant impact on the resolution of claims in
the state succession context. The Yugoslav experience, where Serbia re-
36. Id. at 407.
37. Id. at 408.
38. Id. at 412.
39. Id. (noting, however, that this approach may be less adapted to dissolution of states with
centrally controlled economies because of the lack of third-party access to data).
40. The Paris Club is a voluntary collection of official creditors (such as states and state central
banks) who work to reschedule debt of distressed states. See Paris Club, Description of the Paris Club,
at http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=BOIWP0I (last visited Jan.
21, 2005).
41. The London Club is an informal group of commercial banks who work to reschedule or for-
give debt of distressed states. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 956, 960 n. 5 (2000) (summarily explaining the nature
of the London Club).
42. See infra Part 1I1(B)(1).
43. See infra Part I(C).
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fused to participate in various EU mechanisms for resolving claims involv-
ing the former Yugoslavia, 44 in part because it wanted to include assets
held by SOEs in Yugoslavia,45 is an example. 46 The breakup of Czechoslo-
vakia provides another example, where disagreements between the Czech
Republic and Slovakia were driven in large part by the differential impact
of privatization.
47
One of the few comprehensive mechanisms for private claims is the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"),
established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States ("Settlement Convention"),
which came into force on October 14, 1966.48 Among other things, it pro-
vides standing machinery for conciliation and arbitration of investment
disputes between nationals of signatory states and other signatory states.
49
One hypothesis of this Article is that private debts and claims should
follow the same norms as those for public debts and claims, unless there is
a clear private agreement to the contrary, such as one containing explicit
guarantees by states.
The absence of comprehensive international law models for the reso-
lution of private claims associated with dissolution of states requires refer-
ence to features of several overlapping international and national law
regimes: nationalization, privatization, and bankruptcy.
1. Breach of Contract
The most general legal regime for resolving private claims that cross
state boundaries is the regime for breach of contract. Even when unre-
solved controversies exist over apportioning state assets and responsibility
for state debts in cases of state succession, private creditors and debtors
44. The European Community ("EC") created the EC Arbitration Commission in 1991 to assist in
negotiating a settlement to the Yugoslav conflict. See Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 385-86.
45. Id. at 390 (indicating that Serbia refused to participate meaningfully in the Working Group on
Economic Issues established by the International Peace Conference because it insisted that assets
include all property possessed by former republics, all public property, all property belonging to associ-
ated labor organizations, and all property financed by more than one republic).
46. Id. at 388 (noting "there was little pressure by creditor states to reach an agreement on the
allocation of the debts or assets" because Yugoslavia did not have a substantial amount of external debt
other than debt to international financial institutions).
47. See id. at 406.
48. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 17 U.ST. 1270, available at http://www.worldbank.org/-
icsid/basicdoc/partA.htm.
49. See, e.g., Tradex Hellas S.A. (Greece) v. Republic of Albania, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/94/2, 14 ICSID Rev.-For. Inv- L.J. 197 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/-
icsid/cases/tradex_award.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (arbitration award by the ICSID on an unsuc-
cessful claim by a Greek company against the state of Albania for expropriation of a farming venture).
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remain subject to preexisting private contractual obligations. Claims for
breach of those obligations lie in national courts.
Breach of contract actions traditionally were not available against
states and their instrumentalities, 50 so the private contract regime may be
unavailing when a predecessor or successor state is the obligor on a con-
tract obligation.5 1 Moreover, breach of contract liability may not provide a




Sovereign immunity is implied by an international legal system of co-
equal sovereigns. 53 As U.S. law evolved, however, it extended sovereign
immunity more broadly than the law of many foreign jurisdictions.
54
Moreover, the extension of state activities into the commercial sphere
spawned calls for revision of sovereign immunity doctrine under U.S.
law. 55 In 1952, the U.S. State Department adopted a "restrictive" interpre-
tation of sovereign immunity, which extended immunity to governmental
acts, but not to commercial ones, albeit undertaken by entities nominally
governmental. 56 The restrictive theory is regularly applied by foreign
courts in suits against instrumentalities of the U.S.
57
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"), codifying the restrictive interpretation of sovereign immunity. 58
The FSIA contains a "commercial activities" exception to sovereign immu-
nity, which subjects foreign entities to suit in U.S. courts over their com-
50. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983) (reviewing the history
of sovereign immunity); see id. at 490-91, 497 (holding that federal courts could exercise jurisdiction
over breach of contract claims against state banks under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"), and that the FSIA did not violate Article III of the U.S. Constitution).
51. See discussion infra Part 11(C)(2).
52. See discussion infra Part II(C)(3).
53. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (the immunity of
one sovereign to the exercise of judicial power over it by another is inherent in the concept of sover-
eignty).




57. See Abrams v. Socidt6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer Franqais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 427
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Moreover, the principle is regularly applied in suits against the United States in
foreign courts."), vacated, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) (questioning constitutionality of giving retroac-
tive effect to FSIA), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004) (retroactive effect not unconstitutional).
58. Lee, supra note 54, at 334. The FSIA "was designed to codify the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity and to remove the subject from diplomatic pressures by transferring. . . decisions [about
sovereign immunity] to the judiciary." Abrams, 332 F.3d at 178.
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mercial activities. 59 Uncertainty with respect to the commercial activities
exception to sovereign immunity is particularly troublesome in connection
with suits by private parties against central banks, which often guarantee
private commercial transactions. 60
3. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is the traditional method for resolving private claims when
the debtor lacks sufficient assets fully to satisfy all creditors, but significant
limitations vitiate its utility in the context of final status determination for
Kosovo.
Bankruptcy is a statutory procedure, usually triggered by insolvency, 6 1
in which a (usually private) debtor is reorganized or liquidated by a judicial
body for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. 62 Under U.S. law, there are
two basic forms of bankruptcy: reorganization and liquidation. In a reor-
ganization, the debtor continues as a going concern, and its future earnings
are structured to satisfy part or all of its debts.63 In a liquidation, the
debtor's assets are sold off, with the proceeds used to satisfy its debts.64
The bankruptcy laws of other countries vary widely. French bank-
ruptcy law was extensively reformed in 1984, 1985, and 1994, with goals
of saving enterprises, preserving jobs, and paying creditors. 65 Bankruptcy
proceedings occur before panels of the Commerce Tribunal, comprising lay
businesspeople elected by local chambers of commerce. 66 Creditor control
of the debtor estate is minimized 67 and the court itself decides whether
59. 28 U.S.C. § l605(a)(2) (2000).
60. See Lee, supra note 54 (reviewing application of the FSIA to foreign central banks as defen-
dants).
61. Insolvency is a "financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all
of such entity's property, at a fair valuation." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (32)(A) (2000) (defining "insolvent"); see
also Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group V (Insolvency), 30th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.70
(Part 1) (2003) (defining "insolvency" as "[wjhen the debtor is generally unable to pay its debts as they
mature or when its liabilities exceed the value of its assets"), available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-
index. htm [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part I].
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (7th ed. 1999).
63. See 11 U.S.C. §§ I 101-74 (2000) (reorganization); UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part
I, supra note 61, at 8 (defining reorganization as the "[p]rocess by which the financial well-being and
viability of a debtor's business can be restored and the business continue to operate, using various
means possibly including debt forgiveness, debt rescheduling, debt-equity conversions and sale of the
business (or parts of it) as a going concern").
64. See II U.S.C. §§ 701-84 (liquidation); UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part 1, supra note
61, at 7 (defining liquidation as "[p]roceedings to assemble and reduce the debtor's assets to money for
distribution in accordance with the insolvency law").
65. Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in
France: Ten Years Later, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 442 (1996).
66. Id. at 443.
67. See id. at 442.
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reorganization is possible or whether liquidation is necessary. 68 In contrast,
virtually all reorganizations in Germany occur out of court, a result of in-
adequate reorganization procedures under German bankruptcy law.
69
In 1995, the member states of the European Union adopted the Con-
vention on Insolvency Proceedings ("Insolvency Convention"), which inte-
grates European bankruptcy law. 70 The Insolvency Convention applies to
insolvencies of individual and corporate debtors, but excludes banks and
insurance companies. 7' It provides for an automatic stay and for the ap-
pointment of a trustee. 72 The decisions resulting from an insolvency pro-
ceeding in one member state must be recognized and enforced by courts in
all member states, subject to choice of law rules contained in the Insol-
vency Convention and to the possibility of ancillary proceedings. 73 It does
not, however, address the effect to be given bankruptcy court decisions
from states outside the EU.
74
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") has formulated a legislative guide on insolvency law,
75
seeking to strengthen and harmonize national bankruptcy law.76 The guide
distinguishes between liquidation and reorganization, making recommenda-
tions for effective national law regimes, while noting the socio-political
interests that may thwart complete harmonization.7 7 Among other things, it
recommends subjecting SOEs to bankruptcy provisions applicable to
purely private enterprises.
7 8
A bankruptcy system, whether international or purely local, is infeasi-
ble unless the legal system within the territory where assets are located has
an effective creditors' rights regime. A declaration by a bankruptcy tribunal
68. See id. at 448.
69. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, First Report of the Select Advisory Committee on Business Reor-
ganization, 57 Bus. Law. 163, 174-75 n.7 (2001).
70. Eberhard Schollmeyer, The New European Convention on International Insolvency, 13
BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 421, 422 (1997).
71. Id. at 425.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 435.
74. Id. at 437-38.
75. See UNICITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part I, supra note 61; Draft Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (U NCITRAL) Working
Group V (Insolvency), 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.ViWP.70 (Part 11) (2003), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part It].
76. See Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of its Twenty-ninth Session,
37th Sess., 11, UN. Doc. A/CN.9/542 (2003), available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm
(summarizing the work culminating in UNCITRAL adopting the Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law) [hereinafter 2003 UNCITRAL Report].
77. ld. 2 (noting the difficulty in harmonizing bankruptcy law).
78. Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law Part II, supra note 75, 88-90 (suggesting that
SOEs be subjected to general bankruptcy law, with certain exceptions, such as state guarantees).
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that a creditor is entitled to particular assets is worthless unless the creditor
has a way to compel the legal authorities to force those in possession of the
assets to give them up. Thus, if the assets involved in a bankruptcy are
located in a territory where the authorities do not recognize the legal au-
thority of the bankruptcy apparatus, or in which there is no effective com-
mercial rule of law, those assets are not a meaningful part of the bankrupt
estate.
79
A number of commentators have proposed a "universalist" approach,
in which states would recognize the decisions of the bankruptcy courts of
the state of incorporation of multinational corporations.80 Other commenta-
tors insist that the most that can be hoped for is a greater measure of coop-
eration among national courts, considering parallel bankruptcy proceedings
for the same corporate entity.81 Chapter III of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment provides for national
court recognition of decisions by bankruptcy courts of other jurisdictions,
subject to important exceptions. 82
4. Nationalization, Expropriation, and Eminent Domain
International law does not distinguish meaningfully among nationali-
zation, expropriation, and eminent domain.8 3 All three terms refer to the
exercise of legal power by a state to transfer the ownership of private prop-
erty into state hands. Whenever such power is exercised, the former owners
of the property are likely to have difficulty realizing their claims through
litigation in national courts of other states. The biggest barriers are sover-
eign immunity and the act of state doctrine.
79. See generally Michael T. Hilgers, Debtor-States and an International Bankruptcy Court: The
IMF Creditor Problem, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003) (evaluating and criticizing the International Mone-
tary Fund's ("IMF") proposal for an international bankruptcy court to deal with private and intergov-
emmental claims against insolvent states).
80. Several commentators, however, have suggested that universalism will not work. See Freder-
ick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31 (2001) (questioning the
feasibility of the "universalist" approach to international bankruptcy); Frederick Tung, Fear of Com-
mitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 555 (2001) (same). But see Andrew
T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000)
(defending universalism in the case of nonadjusting creditors).
81. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Ap-
proach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696 (1999) (arguing for a system of cooperative territoriality as the most
feasible approach to international bankruptcies).
82. Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), arts. 15-24, U.N. Sales Doc. E.99.V.3 (1997), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insolvency.htm.
83. See Craig R. Giesze, Helms-Burton in Light of the Common Law and Civil Law Legal Tradi-
tions: Is Legal Analysis A lone Sufficient to Settle Controversies Arising Under International Law on the
Eve of the Second Summit of the Americas?, 32 INT'L LAW. 51, 74 n.127 (1998) (citing Black's Law
Dictionary, French judicial precedent, and foreign-state constitutional provisions for definitions of
nationalization and expropriation).
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In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the validity of an expropriation decree by the Cuban government
could not be questioned in a U.S. court because of the act of state doc-
trine. 84 The controversy arose from facts typical of nationalization or ex-
propriation. A commodity broker purchased sugar from a private enterprise
operating in Cuba. After the sugar was loaded, but before it was shipped,
the government of Cuba nationalized the enterprise. Both the former own-
ers of the nationalized enterprise and the Cuban government claimed the
proceeds, and the Cuban government sued in U.S. federal court.85 The dis-
trict court found the expropriation decree invalid because it violated inter-
national law, and the court of appeals affirmed.
86
The Supreme Court reversed. 87 First, even though the U.S. had not
recognized the Cuban Government, the Court held that the government of
Cuba could sue in U.S. federal court.88 Second, the Court held that the act
of state doctrine foreclosed judicial invalidation of the Cuban law on which
the Cuban Government's claim was based.89 The Court characterized the
act of state doctrine as having arisen in England in 1674 and having been
transplanted to the U.S. in the late eighteenth and early-nineteenth centu-
ries.90 The Court expressed the doctrine as follows:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own terri-
tory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves. 9 1
If the posture of the case had been somewhat different, the Court said,
the act of state doctrine could have been interposed successfully as a de-
fense to a claim by the former owner of the enterprise for the proceeds.
92
The act of state doctrine thus is a powerful barrier to litigation of pri-
vate claims in national courts when the outcome of the litigation is deter-
mined by an expropriation or nationalization law.
The international community has sought to develop international legal
frameworks, accompanied by dispute resolution machinery, to fill the gap,
84. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,437 (1964).
85. Id. at 406-07 (describing the procedural history of the dispute).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 439,
88. Id. at412.
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but working out a multilateral framework for encouraging and protecting
private investment in developing countries has proven difficult.
93
In the late 1990s, members of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development ("OECD") sought unsuccessfully to negotiate a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"), working with the World
Bank through its International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes ("ICSID"). The MAI negotiations were scheduled to be completed by
April 1998, but that deadline has long passed, and most observers consider
the initiative to be dead.
94
The MAI was to have defined rights for private sector investors and to
have included a procedure for seeking recourse against host governments in
investment disputes. The MAI's scope would have included more than
outright nationalization or expropriation; it would have extended to exces-
sive or discriminatory taxation or regulation. The proposed MAI included
the following key components:
1. Nondiscrimination: guaranteeing that "host states" (i.e., states
where the investment is taking place) grant foreign investors
equal or comparable rights to host state (national) investors;
2. Restrictions on certain performance requirements: this would
prohibit states from imposing special targets or other condition-
alities on the activities of investors;
3. Transparency: ensuring that investment-related laws, guidelines,
and procedures are publicly available to ensure predictability;
4. Funds transfer guidelines: ensuring that host states will not re-
strict certain investment-related financial transactions, such as
the transfer of profits back to an investor's home country;
5. Tight controls on expropriation: setting international limits and
laws governing expropriation and subsequent compensation;
and
6. Dispute resolution: establishing binding arbitration procedures
to settle investment-related disputes between states and inves-
tors and between host and home states.95
93. See Peter T. Muehlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033, 1050-53 (2000) (reviewing the history and political context for
negotiating investment-protection agreements).
94. See Jessica S. Wiltse, Comment, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free Trade Area
ofthe Americas: Lessons from NAFTA4 Chapter Eleven, 51 BUFF, L. REv. 1145, 1151 (2003) (referring
to MAI negotiations as "failed"); see also Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A
Solution in Search ofa Problem?, 24 U. PA, . INT'L EcON. L. 77, 83-84 (2003) (questioning the need
for a multilateral agreement on investment because market forces are sufficient to encourage foreign
direct investment).
95. See CHRISTOPHER CHAMBERLAIN, BANK INFO. CTR., THE ROLE OF WORLD BANK GROUP IN
THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 12,
1998), at http://vwwbicusaorg/bicusa/issuesfmisc resources/46l .php.
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Absent such a treaty framework, disputes over alleged discriminatory
treatment of investors or expropriation of investments must be resolved in
national judicial systems of the host country, or of the investor's country,
or through various third-party arbitration and conciliation mechanisms.
Despite the failure of the MAI, bilateral investment-protection treaties
fill the gap.96 Federal statutes in the U.S. contemplate suspension of foreign
assistance to states that expropriate the property of U.S. investors. 97 Chap-
ter 11 of the North America Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") is the only
instance so far in which private investors have been given direct access to
dispute resolution mechanisms that are binding against states. 98
5. Privatization
Privatization superficially appears to be the converse of nationaliza-
tion. In privatization, property formerly owned by the state is transferred to
private owners. But this formulation is misleading. State-owned property
subject to privatization usually is held subject to private claims arising from
loans or other commercial claims by suppliers of equipment or raw mate-
rial. Privatization of such property often involves application of govern-
mental power to extinguish or otherwise to limit such claims. Moreover,
the property subject to privatization often was the subject of an earlier na-
tionalization. Some commentators frame the legal issues involved in priva-
tization as relating to a "nationalization-privatization cycle." 99
Privatization thus presents special problems in the state succession
context. By definition, it results in the transfer of property interests from
96. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 125 (2003) (evaluating the failure of efforts to negotiate multilateral investment
treaties and observing that thousands of bilateral investment treaties are in force).
97. But see Talenti v. Clinton, 102 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (private citizen lacked standing
to compel enforcement of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(1), superseded by the Helms Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1), against Italy for the al-
leged expropriation of plaintiffs property); Betteroads Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d
262, 267-69 (D.P.R. 2000) (private creditor lacks standing to compel enforcement of rarely enforced
statutes authorizing the President to suspend foreign assistance to any foreign state that blocks payment
of claims by a U.S. private entity).
98. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration:
NAFTA Chapter II, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (2003) (evaluating NAFTA Chapter 11 and analyzing the
legal bases for enforcing arbitration decisions on Chapter 11); Wiltse, supra note 94, at 1147-51
(evaluating the desirability and feasibility of extending the concepts of private-investor access to arbi-
tration against states in investment disputes); Lydia Lazar, NAFTA: Structural Damage to the Ship of
State?, in 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 169 (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed., 2001) (arguing that
NAFTA's dispute resolution process diminishes notions of state sovereignty).
99. See George Chifor, Caveat Emptor: Developing International Disciplines for Deterring Third
Party Investment in Unlawfully Expropriated Property, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 179, 185 (2002)
(widespread seizure of foreign-owned property may retum as a phenomenon associated with privatiza-
tion); Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity
in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995) (describing historical and likely future cycles).
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the state to private owners. But to encourage private investment, the priva-
tization process often strips liabilities from the privatized assets and re-
quires that these claims be satisfied by recourse to a special privatization
fund, accumulated from a combination of public funding and payments by
investors in the assets. 100 When the legal personality of the state changes,
the new state may seek to repudiate those transfers. Or, in many cases,
preprivatization creditors of the privatized enterprises may assert liability
against the new owners.
In more complicated cases, such as Kosovo, enterprises were already
privatized or transformed into private ownership, then renationalized by the
political trustee, and finally privatized through a process deriving its legal
power from an ambiguous legal mandate to the trustee. Some claimants
argue that the first privatization process was invalid. Other claimaints argue
that the first privatization process was valid and the second invalid.
Such privatization disputes frequently result in litigation in the courts
of third states. When that occurs, courts presented with the disputes must
decide whether to exercise judicial power over them. U.S. courts generally
have uniformly viewed the activities of privatization agencies as falling
within the judicial immunity conferred by the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, although case authority is mixed on whether such activities
nevertheless present justiciable controversies under the commercial activi-
ties exception of the Act. In Sablic v. Croatia Line, the New Jersey inter-
mediate court held that the Croatian Privatization Fund was a foreign entity
entitled to FSIA immunity. 10 1 In World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate a variety of contract claims asserted by an entity granted
100. The approach of the Kosovo Trust Agency ("KTA") is a good example. See Kosovo Trust
Agency, Objectives of the Kosovo Trust Agency, at http://www.kta-
kosovo.orglhtml/index.ptpmodule=htmlpages&func-display&pid=1 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005)
(explaining the spin-off approach to privatization). The reorganization of the northeast and midwest
railroads in the U.S. is another example, albeit not involving foreign investors. See Regional Rail
Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 111 (1974) (describing the framework for reorganization, requir-
ing owners of rail assets to accept securities in new government-created corporations in exchange for
rail properties). The process represented nationalization of rail assets contemporaneous with privatiza-
tion. Conrail subsequently was financially successful, able to sell securities in private capital markets
and to pay off its obligations to the federal government. See Christian C. Day, Corporate Governance,
Conrail and the Market: Getting on the Right Track!, 26 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2000) (describing the
financial success of Conrail, leading to public offering and subsequent purchase by other railroads). The
previous owners of the rail properties were required to present any claims for deficiency in payments to
them before the US. Claims Court. Absent such a remedy, the Supreme Court held the takings of
private property might raise serious constitutional questions. Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419
U.S. at 148-49.
101. 719 A.2d 172, 177 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1998).
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management rights over a state-owned uranium mining enterprise in
Kazakhstan. 1
0 2
Two district courts found privatization in other countries to be within
the commercial activities exception of the FSIA. 103 To be sure, "[e]ngaging
in a program of privatization does not automatically insulate [another state]
from suit in the United States."'104 But it is well accepted that the applica-
bility of the commercial activities exception is determined, not with refer-
ence to the purpose of the entity claiming immunity under the FSIA, but
with reference to the specific activities drawn into question in the litigation.
In Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, the activity in litigation
was "[t]he sale of a company from its owners to the highest bidder [which]
is a routine commercial transaction." 105 In the case of Kosovo, many activi-
102, 296 F.3d 1154, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court held that the state of Kazakhstan and its
instrumentalities enjoyed immunity under the FSIA and had not waived it. Id. The lawsuit alleged that
the contracts were not performed because of certain decisions reached in the Kazakhstan privatization
process. Id. at 1157-59. The plaintiff did not assert the commercial activities exception. Id. at 1161. The
court held that certain of the defendants were entitled to FSIA immunity and that immunity had been
waived only for certain claims that nevertheless fell within the act of state doctrine. Id. at 1156-57. As
to claims against a private corporation that allegedly interfered with the plaintiff's contracts, the court
remanded for a determination whether jurisdiction existed based on an alleged meeting in the U.S.
involving that private defendant. Id. at 1169-
103. In WMW Machinery, Inc. v. Werkzeugmaschinenhandel GMBH, the district court held that the
German privatization agency (the Treuhand) was not entitled to sovereign immunity because the priva-
tization agency, though an entity of the state of Germany, fell within the commercial activities excep-
tion. 960 F. Supp. 734, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). WMW Machinery sued the Treuhand as an owner of the
German enterprise with which it contracted. Id. at 736. The contract at issue in WMW Machinery (an
exclusive distribution agreement) was to be performed wholly in the United States and Canada. Id. at
737. The Treuhand allegedly ratified the contract at issue and assured WMW that the contract was still
valid. Id. WMW Machinery could be decided by reference only to primarily commercial decisions by
the Treuhand. "The actions that form the basis of plaintiffs' claims reflect an exercise of powers...
akin to those that a controlling stockholder of a corporation might take as a player in the private mar-
ket." Id. at 740 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Compare Dar-El-Bina Eng'g & Contracting Co., Ltd. v. Republic of Iraq, 79 F. Supp. 2d 374,
382 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing claim for nonpayment of commercial obligation as falling outside the
commercial activities exception of the FSIA because there is no obligation to make payment in the
U.S.) with Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
that the nonpayment of debt in the U.S. was sufficient to satisfy the direct effect requirement of the
FSIA commercial activities exception), affid, 941 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing payment
in New York as factual consideration in finding direct effect), affd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 607,
619 (1992) (holding that Argentina's act of diminishing New York's status as a "financial leader" was
insufficient to satisfy the direct effects test, but that contract performance in New York was sufficient).
In Ampac Group. Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, the district court found subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the commercial activities exception to the FSIA, rejecting the defendants' arguments that
"privatizing a national cement industry is an action that could only be taken by a foreign sovereign and
is thus not 'commercial activity"' and that privatization is "merely the 'flip side' of nationalization, a
quintessentially sovereign prerogative." 797 F. Supp. 973, 976, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The district court
also rejected the argument that the act of state doctrine applied to the "unquestionably commercial"
privatization decisions by the government of Honduras. Id. at 978. The court also found personal juris-
diction based on meetings held by Honduran officials in the U.S. Id. at 979.
104. Id. at 976 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
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ties in potential litigation would be policy decisions by the Kosovo Trust
Agency ("KTA") board relating to how privatization should be conducted
after an earlier phase of commercialization under the direction of another
agency. 106
Privatization disputes also may be insulated from litigation in third
countries by the act of state doctrine, which requires the dismissal of cer-
tain national court lawsuits when deciding the merits would require the
court to rule on the validity of acts performed by a foreign government.
10 7
In World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, the court of ap-
peals held the act of state doctrine foreclosed litigation of certain claims
involving privatization as to which the state of Kazakhstan and its instru-
mentalities had waived immunity. 10
106. See generally Abigail Hing Wen, Suing the Sovereign's Servant: The Implications of Privati-
zationfor the Scope of Foreign Sovereign Immunities, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1538 (2003) (proposing an
amcndment to the FSIA to extend the immunity to private entities performing public functions).
107. See Underhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (courts of one country must not sit in
judgment on acts of another government). When a U.S. federal court has jurisdiction over a claim, the
act of state doctrine obliges the court to accept the acts of the foreign sovereign as valid. The policies
supporting the doctrine center around notions of international comity, separation of powers, and a desire
to avoid embarrassing the Executive Branch in its conduct of foreign relations. See World Wide Miner-
als, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Because of these policy
considerations and because ruling on the validity of acts by foreign sovereigns uncomfortably ap-
proaches the political question doctrine, courts routinely avoid ruling on the validity of acts by foreign
sovereigns. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (ruling on foreign acts of state approaches nonjusticiable political questions in
federal courts); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (questions involving foreign relations
would require the judiciary to exercise discretion committed to the Executive); RFSTATEMFNT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 13, § 1, rptrs. n.4 (discussing the
issues courts have held to be nonjusticiable political questions).
The act of state doctrine is a widely applied common law doctrine of judicial decision making,
rather than a statutory command. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964);
Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918). In WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., Int'l, the Supreme Court stated that "[a]ct of state issues only arise when a court must
decide that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a foreign
sovereign." 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (emphasis in original).
108. World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1157.
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III. PAST PRACTICE AND MODELS
A. Secession and National Disintegration
1. Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia presents an especially complicated case. 10 9 Two revolu-
tions were overlaid by the dissolution of a state. Persons owning property
before the Communist revolution presided over by Josip Tito stand in line
alongside persons with property interests derived from the Tito regime-
perhaps as part of a worker community. They compete with persons who
obtained property during Slobodan Milosevic's discriminatory privatization
regime.11 0 By the time of its dissolution, Yugoslavia was one of the most
heavily indebted states involved in the transition from socialism, owing
some $15 billion in 1991,111 and having participated in two rounds of ma-
jor debt restructuring in 1983 and 1988.112 "Allocated debt"--debt incurred
for the benefit of specific republics-amounted to about $12 billion, and
"unallocated debt"--debt incurred by the federal government for purposes
not easily identified with a specific republic-accounted for the $3 billion
remainder. 113 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY")
owed $683 million to the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and $2
billion to the World Bank.1 14 A 1993 estimate concluded that as of 1990
the net assets of the SFRY were about $60 billion, with military assets
comprising 75%, immovable assets 3.4%, and financial assets 21.6%.115
Negotiations over the apportionment of and succession to Yugoslav
assets and debt began soon after international recognition of the former
Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991-1992. Three interna-
tional peace conferences on the former Yugoslavia addressed succession,
without significant results.11 6 A negotiated solution was frustrated until
109. See, e.g., Ana Stanid, Financial Aspects of State Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 751 (2001) (reviewing negotiations over Yugoslav succession and analyzing agreements
reached with the IMF, the World Bank, and the London and Paris Clubs); MOJMIR MRAK,
APPORTIONMENT AND SUCCESSION OF EXTERNAL DEBTS: THE CASE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (Vienna Inst Int'l Econ. Studs. No. 259, 1999).
110. See Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 392-94 (the European Community Arbitration Com-
mission essentially punted on questions presented to it about state succession to debts and assets).
111. See Stani6, supra notel09, at 758 (quantifying total debt at $15.99 billion, with $3.79 billion
unallocated and $12.2 billion allocated).
112. See MRAK, supra note 109, at 3.
113. Id. at4.
114. Id. at 13. More than $ 1.3 billion of this was for project loans, with clearly identifiable benefi-
ciaries in individual republics of former Yugoslavia. Id.
115. See Stani6, supra note 109, at 755.
116. MRAK, supra note 109, at 8-9 (describing institutional mechanisms for negotiations over
succession).
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2001 by rump Yugoslavia's insistence that no dissolution of Yugoslavia
had occurred and, instead, that rump Yugoslavia was the "continuator"
state. 117 All of the breakaway republics and the international community
disagreed.11 8 In Republic of Croatia v. Girocredit Bank A.G. der Sparkas-
sen, the Austrian Supreme Court enjoined rump Yugoslavia from disposing
of assets represented by an account in an Austrian bank, holding that, after
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the assets represented joint property of the
successor states. 119
A further barrier to negotiations was the fact that most of the assets
were held by one successor state-the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("FRY"). Moreover, the FRY had spent most of the foreign currency re-
serves. 120 Disagreements existed over the proper date to use for dissolution,
a date that significantly impacted valuation. 121 In addition, Slovenia argued
that Yugoslav "connected persons" should be excluded as beneficiaries of
any negotiated agreement. 122 And, what constituted "state property" was
blurred by the Yugoslav concept of "social ownership." If socially-owned
property were excluded, the level of assets would be diminished
significantly. 1
23
The lack of success with the international conference approach to re-
solving succession issues, combined with the desire of the breakaway re-
publics to normalize their relations with the international financial
community, led all to embrace direct negotiations as the institutional
mechanism for determining succession. 124 These direct negotiations re-
sulted in agreement on several important issues, including assignment of
allocated debt to the republic for whose benefit the debt had been occurred,
conforming to customary international law, 125 and determination of a
117. See Stani6, supra note 109, at 754.
118. See MRAK, supra note 109, at 11 (discussing the Badinter Commission's Opinions I & 8,
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 757 and 777, and noting the 1992 decision by the IMF and the 1993
decision by the World Bank).
119. Austria: Supreme Court Decision in Republic of Croatia et al. v. Girocredit Bank A.G. der
Sparkassen, Dec. 17, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1520, 1529.
120. Stani6, supra note 109, at 755. Stani concluded that, "[cllearly, the FRY should account to
the four successor states for these assets. Their actual division, however, is no longer possible as they
have either been spent, or in case of military assets are destroyed or obsolete." Id. at 771.
121. Id. at757-58.
122. Id. at 762. "Connected persons" were persons who had purchased Yugoslav debt on secondary
markets at a discount, allegedly with assets belonging to Yugoslavia. Id.
123. See id. at 764 (describing the dispute over whether socially-owned property constituted "state
property").
124. See MRAK, supra note 109, at 11; Stani , supra note 109, at 752.
125. See MRAK, supra note 109, at 6 (noting the practice of assigning allocated debt to the benefi-
ciary successor state); id. at 10 (reporting the adoption of principles tor Yugoslav succession by the
World Bank).
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"key"-percentages for apportioning nonallocated debt to each breakaway
republic. 12 6 Separate bilateral agreements were then reached between the
successor states and the London and Paris Clubs, which dealt with the bulk
of the former Yugoslavia's financial liabilities, 127 mostly following the
pattern set by the IMF and World Bank negotiations as to assignment of
allocated debt and the key for apportionment of unallocated debt. 1
28
After Milosevic stepped down as leader of rump Yugoslavia, that state
abandoned its position that it was the continuator state and agreed that
Yugoslavia had dissolved. 129 Shortly thereafter, the five former states of
the SFRY reached an agreement regarding various succession issues in
June 2001, using the IMF key. 130 All five successor states signed the
Agreement on Succession Issues Between the Five Successor States of the
Former State of Yugoslavia ("Agreement") on June 29, 2001.131
A percentage of the former Yugoslavia's assets, not distributed ac-
cording to previous bilateral agreements, were divided up among the suc-
cessor states. 132 All immovable state property of the former Yugoslavia
was passed to the successor state on whose territory the property was cur-
rently situated. 133 Movable state property of the former Yugoslavia was
passed to the successor state in whose territory the property was located on
the date that state declared independence. 1
34
126. See id. The apportionment of nonallocated debt was calculated as follows: Serbia-Montegro:
36.52%; Croatia: 28.49%; Slovenia: 16.39%; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 13.2%; and Macedonia: 5.4%.
Id. The IMF "key" was determined based on economic criteria such as the republics' contributions to
the federal budget, their share in social product and export earnings, and their percentage of Yugosla-
via's population and territory. Stanit, supra note 109, at 759.
127. See Agreeement on Succession Issues Between the Five Successor States of the Former State
of Yugoslavia, June 29, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 1, 1 (Introductory Note by Sir Author Watts) [hereinafter
Agreement on Succession Issues]. One successor state, the FRY, had not yet concluded any agreements
regarding its share of debt liability and was required to assume responsibility for its allocated debt to
Paris Club and London Club creditors and for its unallocated debt to such creditors. See id. at annex C,
art. 3(2); see also Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 397 (noting that the Paris Club, prodded by
Germany, took main responsibility for allocating debt of the former Yugoslavia).
128. See MRAK, supra note 109, at 17 (noting the London Club's deviations from the IMF's calcu-
lated percentages).
129. Stani6, supra note 109, at 753 (reporting the FRY's concession that the SFRY has dissolved).
130. See id. at 779 (noting agreement using IMF key); Agreement on Succession Issues, supra note
127, at 2. The five successor states included: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the FRY (comprised of the provinces of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina). See id. at 1.
131. Seeid.at2.
132. See id. at Annex C, arts. 4, 5. The distributed assets included the former Yugoslavia's funds at
the Yugoslav Bank for Intemational Economic Co-operation and foreign financial assets. See id.
133. Id. at Annex A, art. 2(1).
134. Id. at Annex A, art. 3(l). Movable property is not transferred to the successor state if the
property is of great cultural importance to another successor state and the property originated from that
state. Id. at Annex A, art. 3(2).
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A joint committee of senior representatives of each successor state
was created to serve as a forum to address issues arising from the imple-
mentation of the Agreement on Succession Issues. 135 Any disagreements
over the interpretation or application of the Agreement on Succession Is-
sues were first to be resolved by discussion among the concerned states.
136
If the disagreement could not be resolved through discussions within one
month, the concerned states could refer the matter to either an independent
person or the joint committee. 
137
The Agreement on Succession Issues was to come into force thirty
days after ratification by all five states.138 By July 2002, all but Croatia had
ratified the Agreement on Succession Issues, 139 with Croatia finally ratify-
ing in March 2004.140
2. Soviet Union
In the case of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, insistence on inter-
national legal norms played a relatively small role. Creditor states used
leverage in negotiations, withholding recognition and access to the interna-
tional financial system until successor states agreed to be obligated by the
debt of the former Soviet Union.
14 1
The negotiations were driven by Russia's desire to assume both assets
and debts, and by mistrust of the international financial community that
successor states except for Russia would ever be in a position to satisfy
their obligations.
142
In order to privatize the Russian state-run oil industry, the Russian in-
dustry was carved up into regional monopolies and joint (public and pri-
vate) stock companies were created. 143 At first, the Russian government
sold shares of the state-run companies through vouchers only to workers
135. Id. at art. 4(1)-(2). The rules of procedure were left to the joint committee to establish itself.
Id- at art, 4(4).
136. Id. at art. 5(l).
137. Id, atart. 5(2)(a)-(b).
138. Id. atart. 12(1).
139. Slovenia and NATO, Political Issues, at http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/ratification/time-
table/political-eeonomie/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
140. Croation Notfies U.N. on Ratification of Succession Agreement, BBC MONITORING INT'L
REPS., May 4, 2004, available in LexisNexis AllNews database and on file with the Chicago-Kent Law
Review.
141. Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 369.
142. Id. at 376-83.
143. ARIEL COHEN & GERALD P. O'DRSCOLL, JR., THE ROAD TO ECONOMIC PROSPERITY FOR A
POST-SADDAM IRAQ 9 (Heritage Found. Backgrounder No. 1633, 2003), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/loader cfm?url=/commonspotsecurity/getfile.cfm&PageI
D=37452; Energy Information Administration, Russia, at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/pgem/ch4a.html.
20051
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and Russian citizens. 144 Later, foreigners were allowed to purchase any
remaining shares. 14 5 Russia did not completely privatize its oil industry;
nor did it privatize all state companies, and it retained state ownership of
some of the stock in other companies. 146
Various problems have plagued the Russian oil privatization plan. In
1995, large blocks of shares in many state-run oil companies were auc-
tioned off to a group of Russian banks in exchange for cash. 147 The insider
dealings of the politically connected banks discredited Russian privatiza-
tion. 148 Additionally, the use of vouchers and the initial denial of foreign
investment resulted in lower revenues for the Russian government.1
49
3. Czechoslovakia
The former Czechoslovakia is another complicated example, where:
distribution of assets was substantially more complicated than the alloca-
tion of debts. The reasons for the difficulties encountered in distributing
assets were (1) the majority of the institutions were still in the state
hands[;] (2) since the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the republics had prac-
tically no legal or institutional base for a market economy; (3) privatiza-
tion, in the form of vouchers, had already begun by the former
Czechoslovakian government to citizens of both republics, prior to disso-
lution; and (4) tension existed between the republics due to the dispro-
portionately severe effects of privatization on the Slovak Republic.15
0
Originally, every adult citizen of the Czech Republic was given priva-
tization vouchers.1 5 1 These vouchers could be used to purchase shares of
SOEs. 152
Corruption and an inadequate legal system allowed this privatization
program to be exploited.15 3 For example, one entrepreneur, Viktor Kozeny,
created an "investment fund" that collected vouchers from more than
144. Energy Information Administration, supra note 143.
145. Id.
146. COHEN & O'DRISCOLL, supra note 143, at 9. Privatized oil companies expanded production
and exports, while government-run companies have not expanded as rapidly. See id. Privatized compa-
nies also have been more successful than government-run companies at attracting foreign investment.
Id.
147. Energy Information Administration, supra note 143.
148. COHEN & O'DRISCOLL, supra note 143, at 9. Large banks and industrial groups have become
the major players in the sale of shares in Russian state-run companies. Henry Gibbon, Mass Privatisa-
lion Nearly Completed, FINANCIAL NEWS, May 25, 1998.
149. COHEN & DRISCOLL, supra note 143, at 9.
150. Williams & Harris, supra note 2, at 401 (citations omitted).
1S1. Thomas Fuller, A 'Bad Situation' is Looking a Lot Better; The New Europe: Czech Republic,
INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Oct. 20, 2003, at 10.
152. Keith Dovkants, A Most Impeccable Crook, EVENING STANDARD (London), Oct. 23, 2002, at
16.
153. See William Megginson, Privatization, 118 FOREIGN POL'Y 14,24 (2000).
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820,000 Czech citizens. 154 Kozeny began siphoning off money from the
fund, and individual shareholders lost most of their money. 155 In 2003,
Kozeny was indicted for fraud in the Czech Republic and the U.S.156
B. Regime Change Through Revolution or Conquest
International law treats regime change differently from state succes-
sion. Regime change involves substitution of one government for another,
with the sovereignty of the state remaining intact. State succession involves
changes in state sovereignty over a territory. U.S. courts consistently have
applied this distinction in cases involving the Communist revolution in
China,157 the 1917 Russian Revolution,158 post-World War II Germany,
159
and more recent coups in Sudan. 1
60
Nevertheless, regime change often creates situations in which the or-
dinary national legal machinery is unacceptable as a way of resolving dis-
putes over changes in property rights incident to the change. Machinery
established to deal with claims arising from the Holocaust, from the Islamic
revolution in Iran, and from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq provide recent
examples.
154. See Dovkants, supra note 152, at 16.
155. Seeid.
156. Nick Carey, Pirate of Prague Indicted for Fraud in US., PRAGUE BUS. J., Oct. 6, 2003. Koz-
eny later tried a similar scheme in Azerbaijan. See Dovkant, supra note 152, at 16. Kozeny collected
money to purchase privitization vouchers from the Azerbaijan government. Id. The vouchers were to be
used to purchase shares in the state oil industry, but the Azerbaijan government would not sell shares of
the state oil industry to foreigners. Id. Kozeny was later accused of using the money for his personal
expenses. See Carey, supra.
157. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 871-72 (N.D.Ala. 1982) (holding
the People's Republic of China liable as successor government for bonds issued by the Imperial Chi-
nese government in 1911), affdon other grounds, 794 F.2d 1490 (11 th Cir. 1986).
158. United States v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 90 F. Supp. 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (finding that
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 did not amount to state succession).
159. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 853, 857 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that the German Democratic Republic was entitled to possession of stolen paintings as succes-
sor government to the Third Reich), ajfd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
160. See, e.g., Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 619, 623
(S.D.N.Y- 1990) The court wrote:
The military coups of 1985 and 1989 did not effect a succession of state of the Sudan but
merely changed the stale's governing body, leaving the state's obligations undisturbed....
[T]he rights and liabilities of a state are unaffected by a change either in the form or personnel
of its government, however accomplished, whether by revolution or otherwise. No other doe-
trine is thinkable, at least among nations which have any conception of international honor.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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1. Iran
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal ("Tribunal"), 16 1 characterized as an
"international arbitral tribunal," 162 was established after the revolutionary
government of Iran released American hostages in order to permit Iran to
regain its international financial position. Establishment of the Tribunal led
to lifting various attachments and liens on its assets resulting from piece-
meal litigation in the regular courts. 163 The Tribunal:
has jurisdiction to decide claims of United States nationals against Iran
and of Iranian nationals against the United States, which arise out of
debts, contracts, expropriations or other measures affecting property
rights; certain "official claims" between the two Governments relating to
the purchase and sale of goods and services; disputes between the two
Governments concerning the interpretation or performance of the Algiers
Declarations; and certain claims between United States and Iranian bank-
ing institutions. 164
Purely private claims-those by private persons against private per-
sons-were excluded. One case, Riahi v. Government of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, illustrates the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction over private
claims. 165 The plaintiff alleged that Iran expropriated shareholder and
161. See generally Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, at http://www.iusct.org/index-english.html
(last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
162. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concern-
ing the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), art. II, 1 (Jan. 19, 1981), at
http://www.iusct.org/claims-settlement.pdf [hereinafter Claims Agreement].
163. See Iran-United States Claims Tribumnal, Background Information, at http://www.iusct.-
org/background-english.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
164. Id. The Tribunal Agreement gives it jurisdiction over:
1. [C]laims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of
Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises out of the same
contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that na-
tional's claim, if such claims and counterclaims are outstanding on the date of this
Agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts
(including transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or bank guaran-
tees), expropriations or other measures affecting property rights, excluding claims
described in Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of
January 19, 1981, and claims arising out of the actions of the United States in re-
sponse to the conduct described in such paragraph, and excluding claims arising
under a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any dis-
putes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian
courts, in response to the Majlis position.
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the United States
and Iran against each other arising out of contractual arrangements between them
for the purchase and sale of goods and services.
3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in Paragraphs 16-17 of the Dec-
laration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981, over any dispute as to
the interpretation or performance of any provision of that Declaration.
Claims Agreement, supra note 162, at art. II.
165. See Riahi v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 80-485-1, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 176 (1992).
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creditor interests in several enterprises, including ownership interests in an
apartment building and personal property located therein, two automobiles,
four horses, and certain other property.
166
An estimated 1,000 claims for $250,000 or more and 2,800 claims for
less than $250,000 were filed before January 19, 1982.167 Claims were
decided by one of three three-member Chambers of the Tribunal or by the
Full Tribunal. 168 Rules of decision were the UNCITRAL arbitration rules,
as modified by the governments and the Tribunal. 169 Awards in favor of
U.S. claimants were payable from an account established by Iran at the
Settlement Bank of the Netherlands. 1
70
By October 2003, the Tribunal had terminated 880 claims by decision




The United Nations Compensation Commission ("UNCC") 172 was
created by the U.N. Security Council in 1991 to resolve claims growing out
of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 173 Iraq, however, failed to cooperate, and the
UNCC and the U.N. Compensation Fund ("Fund") operated under a variety
of ad hoe arrangements until adoption of Security Council Resolution 1330
in 2000, which established a 25% level of funding.
174
The UNCC accepted claims by individuals, corporations, and gov-
ernments, submitted by governments, and claims submitted by international
166. Nancy Combs et al, International Courts and Tribunals, 37 INT'L LAW. 523, 537 (describing
case).




171. Communiqu6 from the Office of the Secretary-General of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal (Jan. 20, 2004), at http://www.iusct.org/communique-english-pdf.
172. See generally United Nations Compensation Commission, at http://www.unog.chluncc (last
visited Jan. 24, 2005).
173. See Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687,
1-2, U.N- Doc S/22559 (1991), available at http://www.unog ch/uncc/resolutio/res22559.pdf (find-
ing Iraq responsible for damages occasioned by the invasion of Iraq, and directing the Secretary-
General to develop recommendations for a compensation fund and a commission to administer it); id,
4 (noting that the UNCC must determine the level of contribution to the U.N. Compensation Fund,
allocate funds and payments of claims, evaluate losses, list claims and verify their validity, and resolve
disputed claims); S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 2987th mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/692 (1991) (establish-
ing the UNCC and U.N. Compensation Fund); S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 3004th mtg. 1 2, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/705 (1991) (adopting the recommendation by the Secretary-General to satisfy claims through a
Compensation Fund, financed by up to 30% of the value of Iraq's exports of petroleum and petroleum
products).
174. S.C. Res. 1330, U.N. SCOR,4241stmtg. 12, U.N Doc. S/RES/1330 (2000).
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organizations for individuals who were not in a position to have their
claims filed by a government. 17 5 Under the rules adopted by the UNCC,
claims, including claims of individuals and private corporations, could be
submitted only by governments or other persons or entities specifically
authorized. 176 Eligible claims included those for losses occasioned by
forced departure from Iraq; losses of personal property, bank accounts,
stocks and other securities, income, real property, construction, or other
contract losses; losses from the nonpayment for goods or services; losses
related to the destruction or seizure of business assets; loss of profits; oil
sector losses; and individual business losses. 177 Deadlines were established
for presentation of claims, the latest of which expired in 1997.178 As of
October 27, 2004, the UNCC reported that approximately 99% of claims
totalling some $277 billion had been resolved, with nearly $49 billion
awarded, and over $18 billion actually paid.179
After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.N. Security Council
linked the UNCC and the Fund to the new governing institutions of Iraq
under the Occupying Authority and Governing Council and provided for
continuing funding of the Fund. 180 It also stayed national legal proceedings
against proceeds from petroleum and other energy products, pending estab-
lishment of a representative government and a restructuring of Iraq's
debt. 181
175. U.N. Compensation Commission Governing Council, Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure,
art. 5, 6th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/AC.26/1992/10 (1992), available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/dec-
ision/dec_ 10.pdf.
176. Id.
177. See U.N. Compensation Commission, The Claims, at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2005) (describing Category "C," "D," and "E" claims).
178. Id.
179. U.N. Compensation Commision, Status of Claims Processing (Oct. 27, 2004), at
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/status.htm.
180. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg. 21, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1483 (2003) (making
funding requirements binding on ultimate government of Iraq and any successor).
181. Resolution 1483 reads:
[The Security Countil decides that] petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originat-
ing in Iraq shall be immune, until title passes to the initial purchaser from legal proceedings
against them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution, and
that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal
systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds and obligations arising from sales thereof,
as well as the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to
those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the abovementioned privileges and immuni-
ties will not apply with respect to any legal proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds or
obligations is necessary to satisfy liability for damages assessed in connection with an eco-
logical accident, including an oil spill, that occurs after the date of adoption of this resolution;
Decides that all Member States in which there are:
a) funds or other financial assets or economic resources of the previous Government
of Iraq or its state bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside Iraq as of the
date of this resolution, or
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3. The Holocaust
A Claims Resolution Tribunal ("Holocaust Tribunal") 182 was estab-
lished in 1997 to resolve claims by Holocaust victims and their successors
to dormant Swiss bank accounts, assets deposited in Swiss banks before
and during World War II, and to claims arising under insurance policies
issued to victims of Nazi persecution by Swiss insurance companies. The
Holocaust Tribunal was funded by a settlement from the Holocaust Victim
Assets class action litigation against Swiss banks in U.S. district court.
183
Under the settlement, Swiss banks paid $1.25 billion in exchange for the
release of all claims relating to the Holocaust and World War If.184 The
Holocaust Tribunal illustrates the use of class action litigation under U.S.
law as a mechanism to force negotiation of claims dispute resolution ma-
chinery in the international context. 1
85
A separate International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims ("ICHEIC") was established in 1998 to resolve claims arising from
insurance policies issued prior to and during the Holocaust. 186 The ICHEIC
was established through negotiations involving European insurance com-
panies, U.S. insurance regulators, representatives of international Jewish
and Holocaust survivor organizations, and the State of Israel. 187 The signa-
b) funds or other financial assets or economic resources that have been removed from
Iraq, or acquired, by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi
regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned or con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at
their direction,
shall freeze without delay those funds or other financial assets or economic resources and,
unless these funds or other financial assets or economic resources are themselves the subject
of a prior judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or judgement, immediately shall cause their
transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq, it being understood that, unless otherwise ad-
dressed, claims made by private individuals or non-government entities on those transferred
funds or other financial assets may be presented to the internationally recognized, representa-
tive government of Iraq; and decides further that all such funds or other financial assets or
economic resources shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and protections as provided
under paragraph 22.
Id. 22-23 (emphasis in original).
182. See generally Claims Resolution Tribunal, at http://www.crt-ii.rg/index en.phtm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2005).
183. Combs, supra note 166, at 538-39 (describing the dispute resolution system). The Holocaust
Tribunal acquired jurisdiction under settlement of a U.S. class action. See In re Holocaust Victim
Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving the Holocaust Tribunal and Fund in
settlement of consolidated class actions); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191, 193 (2d
Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of motion to intervene by a Polish class in a worldwide class action).
184. Combs, supra note 166, at 538.
185. But see Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686, 695 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (dismissing
claims arising during World War 11 as presenting nonjusticiable political questions).
186. The International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, at http://www.ieheic.org
(last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
187. International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, About ICHEIC, at
http://www.icheic.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
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tory insurers promised to fund claims awards. 188 As of early 2004, the
ICHEIC had received nearly $500 million to pay claims and had paid $16
million to claimants. 18 9 As of November 2004, ICHEIC had offered $108
million for Holocaust-era insurance policies. 190
In In re Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. Holocaust Insurance Litigation,
however, a district court denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens, finding that the ICHEIC was an inadequate alternative
forum. 19 1 The court distinguished such a private dispute resolution body
from a public court, characterizing it as a "company store," dependent on
interested parties. 192
4. Bulgarian Reprivatization Law
Separate Bulgarian laws compensated for farmland expropriated or
voluntarily granted to the state 193 and for other real estate expropriated by
the state. 194 If the claimant was a foreign corporation, foreign national, or a
Bulgarian citizen permanently residing abroad, any restored farmland must
have been transferred within three years to a Bulgarian citizen, the state, or
a Bulgarian corporation or cooperative.1
95
Individuals or their heirs could have their real estate restored. 196 A
corporation's expropriated real estate could be restored to the corporation if
it was still existing at the time the reprivitazation law was enacted.197 If the
corporation no longer existed at that time, the real estate was restored to the
associates or members of the corporation or their heirs. 198
188. International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, Memorandum of Understand-
ing, 8, at http://www.icheic.org/pdf/ICHEIC MOU.PDF (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
189. Press Release, International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, $16 Million
Paid to Holocaust-Era Insurance Claimants From ICHEIC Humanitarian Fund (Mar. 30, 2004), at
http://www.icheic.org/newsroom.html.
190. Press Release, International Commision on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, ICHEIC has
Made $108 Million in Offers for Shoah-era Insurance Policies (Nov. 18, 2004), at
http://www.icheic.org/pdf/Press/ 20Release%201 1-18 -04.pdf.
191. In re Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A Holocaust Ins. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348, 353-58
(SD.N.Y. 2002).
192. Id. at 356-57.
193. See Ownership and Use of Farm Land Act, State Gazette No. 17, arts. 10(2H6) (1991)
(Bulg.), available at www.bild.net/legislation.
194. See Restitution of Nationalised Real Property Act, State Gazette No. 15, arts. 1-2 (1992)
(Bulg.), available at www.bild.netllegislation; Transformation and Privatisation of State-Owned and
Municipal Enterprises Act, State Gazette No. 38, art. 18(1) (1992) (Bulg.), available at
www.bild.net/legislation.
195. Ownership and Use of Farm Land Act, supra note 193, at art. 10a(3).
196. Restitution of Nationalised Real Property Act, supra note 194, at art. 3(1).
197. Id. at art. 3(2).
198. Id
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Expropriated farmland was compensated by restoring ownership of
the land to the claimant if the original boundaries of the property could be
determined and remained in existence.199 If the original boundaries did not
exist, expropriated farmland was compensated by providing the original
owner with farmland equivalent in quantity and quality within the same
local area.200 If compensation was previously granted for expropriated
farmland, the original or equivalent farmland would be granted to the
original owner only if he or she returned the compensation.
20 1
Nationalized real estate was restored to its original owner. 202 When
the reprivatization law went into effect on February 17, 1992, the real es-
tate must have been owned by the state, a township, or a public organiza-
tion. 203 The real estate also had to exist in the same dimensions as it did
when the property was expropriated. 20 4 If these two conditions were not
met, the original owner was still entitled to compensation under "a proce-
dure laid down in a separate enactment." 20 5 Real estate was not restored if
the original owner previously had been compensated with an equivalent
cash payment or with real estate of equal value.20 6 If a person already oc-
cupied the property, the tenant could not be removed for three years follow-
ing the enactment of the law. 207 The current tenant, however, had to pay
rent to the restored owner.
20 8
Original owners of expropriated real property that had been part of the
long-term assets of a state- or municipal-owned enterprise were compen-
sated with shares of stock in the company formed by the privatization of
199. Ownership and Use of Farmland Act, supra note 193, at art. 1Oa(l).
200. Id. at arts. 10a(2), 17(l).
201. id. at art. 10(2).
202. See Restitution of Nationalised Real Property Act, supra note 194, at arts. 1-2.
203. Id. at arts. 1(1), 2(2).
204. Id.
205. Id. at art. 3(3). The property also could be restored if the original building had been destroyed
and the lot was still vacant. See Restitution of Some Expropriated Property Act, State Gazette No. 15,
art. 1(2) (1992) (Bulg.), available at www.bild.net/legislation.
206. Restitution of Nationalised Real Property Act, supra note 194, at art. 4(1). Original owners
who received bonds or had debts withheld in exchange for their real property were not considered to
have been compensated. Id. at art. 4(1)-(2). Additionally, the former owners and their heirs of shops,
workshops, warehouses, and studios that were sold under Decree No. 60 of 1975 could have their
property restored if they reimbursed the buyers the sum the former owner received from the sale. See
Restitution of the Ownership of Some Shops, Workshops, Warehouses, and Studios Act, State Gazette
No. 105, art. 1 (1991) (Bulg.), available at www.bild.net/legislation. If improvements were made to the
property, the purchaser was entitled to compensation by the original owner for the value of those im-
provements, but the purchaser was not entitled to retain the property. See id. at art. 2(1).
207. Restitution of Nationalised Real Property Act, supra note 194, at art. 6(2). The three-year term
also applied if the property was being used as a child-care institution, school, or health institution. Id. at
art. 6(3).
208. Id. at art. 6(2). A rental contract could be cancelled until the three-year term had expired. Id.
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such enterprises equal to the value of the expropriated property.209 If the
original owner previously had been given any kind of compensation for the
expropriated real property, compensation was not granted.
210
A claim for farmland was required to be submitted to the Municipal
Land Board within seventeen months after the reprivitzation law came into
force. 211 Any application for compensation for farmland was available to
the public for examination. 2 12 The Municipal Land Board determined
whether the original property would be restored or whether equivalent
property would be granted.21 3 The Municipal Land Board's decision could
be appealed to a district court within fourteen days of notification.2 14 The
district court reviewed the claim de novo.
2 15
Claims for real property that had been part of the long-term assets of a
state- or municipal-owned enterprise had to be filed by September 30,
1994.216 Claims for SOEs were submitted to the Council of Ministers, and
claims for municipal enterprises were submitted to the local municipal
council. 217 Decisions could be appealed to a district court within fourteen
days after notice had been received.
2 18
5. Hungarian Reprivatization Law
All private property that was nationalized or taken from its original
owner under coercion between 1939 and 1987 was eligible for compensa-
tion,2 19 including both real and personal property.220 A claimant had to be a
209. Transformation and Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises Act, supra note
194, at art. 18(1).
210. Id. atart. 18(4).
211. Ownership and Use of Farm Land Act, supra note 193, at art. 11(1).
212. See id. at art. 13(1).
213. Seeid. atart. 14(1).
214. !d. atart. 14(3).
215. Id. "The Court shall rule at the substance of the matter." Id.
216. Transformation and Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises Act, supra note
194, at art. 18(1).
217. Id-
218. Id. at art. 18(3).
219. Law XXV of 1991 On Partial Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State to
Properties Owned by Citizens in the Interest of Setting Owner Relations, 1(1)-(3), Supp. Nos. 1-2
(Hung.) [hereinafter First Compensation Law]. The original version of the First Compensation Law
only compensated for losses that occurred after June 8, 1949 (the first session of the Communist Par-
liament). See Compensation Law Passed, MTI ECONEWS, June 26, 1991. Before the Hungarian Presi-
dent signed the original First Compensation Law, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared that
section of the law unconstitutional. Id. The Hungarian Parliament then extended the First Compensation
Law to property lost as far back as 1939. Id.
220. See First Compensation Law, supra note 219, 4; Act XXIV of 1992 On Providing in the
Interest of Settling Ownership Relations, Partial Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the
State to Properties of Citizens Through Applying Legal Regulations Enacted From May 1, 1939, to
June 8, 1994 § 3 (Hung.) [hereinafter Second Compensation Law].
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natural person. 22 1 Both current Hungarian citizens and non-Hungarian citi-
zens could claim lost property.222 Non-Hungarian citizens, however, could
claim property only if they were a Hungarian citizen on the date the prop-
erty was taken, if they were a non-Hungarian citizen whose property was
lost in connection with the deprivation of his or her Hungarian citizenship,
or if they were a resident of Hungary on December 31, 1990.223
If the former owner of the property was deceased, his descendant was
entitled to compensation up to the share due to the former owner. 224 A
surviving spouse could collect the compensation if the former owner had
no surviving descendants and the spouse and the former owner were mar-
ried and living together both at the time of the former owner's death and at
the time the property was taken away.
2 2 5
The only form of compensation available was transferable, bearer se-
curities called compensation coupons. 226 A lump sum payment for the
value of the lost property was granted in compensation coupons.
227 Com-
pensated real property was valued between 200 to 2,000 Forints per square
meter, depending on the property's location.228 The value of farmland was
calculated differently. 229 Farmland was compensated based on the regis-
tered net income of the land.230 The compensated value for a lost company
was based on the number of employees. 2 31 The compensation for various
movable assets (i.e., wedding rings, necklaces, and watches) was estab-
lished by the object's weight and composition.
232
The value of property was compensated 100% up to 200,000
Forints.233 If the value of the property exceeded 200,000 Forints, only a
percentage of the value above 200,000 Forints was compensated. 234 The





226. Id. 5(1)-(2). Compensation coupons paid interest for three years at 75% the basic interest
rate of Hungary's central bank. Id. 5(3).
227. Id. 3(1),5(l).
228. Id. at Supp. 3.
229. See id. 13.
230. Id. 13(1).
231. Id. at Supp. 3.
232. Second Compensation Law, supra note 220, Supp. 3. Weight and karat guidelines were set
forth for various objects when the weight and composition could not be established. Id.
233. First Compensation Law, supra note 219, 4(2).
234. Id. For property valued 200,001 to 300,000 Forints, only 50% of the value was compensated
for the portion above 200,000 Forints. Id. If the property was valued from 300,001-500,000 Forints, the
claimant only received 30% of the value for the value above 300,000 Forints. Id. For property that was
valued above 500,001 Forints, only 10% of the value of the property was compensated for the value
above 500,000 Forints. Id.
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maximum amount of compensation granted per owner for each piece of
property could not exceed 5,000,000 Forints.235
Compensation coupons could be used to purchase shares of businesses
privatized by the state. 236 Compensation coupons also could be used to
purchase farmland and state-owned apartments. 237 Some of the farmland
owned by the state was sold at auction, with only those who own compen-
sation coupons being allowed to bid.238 Any farmland purchased at such an
auction had to be used for agricultural purposes for five years. 239 If the
farmland was not used for agricultural purposes for five years, the property
was transferred back to the state, and compensation was not given. 240 Addi-
tionally, if the government auctioned property once owned by a claimant,
the claimant was entitled to bid on the lost property.24 1
A claimant was required to file an application for compensation with a
local Hungarian Compensation Office by March 15, 1994.242 The local
Compensation Office at which the claimant filed an application decided the
amount of compensation.243 The local Compensation Office's decision
could be appealed to the National Compensation Office, 244 and a Hungar-
ian court could hear appeals from the National Compensation Office. 245
IV. POWER TO EXTINGUISH PREEXISTING RIGHTS
The success of any system for claims resolution depends either on
voluntary waiver of preexisting rights, as in the ICHEIC system, 24 6 or the
235. Id. 14(3).
236. Id. 7(l)(a). Compensation coupons were accepted for up to at least 10% of the value of state
companies being transformed into business organizations. Id. 8(3).
237 Id. 7(l)(b), (2).
238. Id. 27. In certain locations, compensation coupon holders got to bid first at 80% of the
farmable land. Act LXIII of 1995, On the Amendment of Act XXV of 1991 On the Partial Compensa-
tion for Damages Caused Unlawfully in the Property of Citizens by the State, in the Interest of the
Settlement of Property Relationships § 1 (Hung.).
239. First Compensation Law, supra note 219, 23(l).
240. Id. 23(2).
241. Id. 9.
242. See Act II of 1994 On the Amendment of Act XXV of 1991 on the Deadline of the Submis-
sion of Applications for Compensation, and on the Partial Compensation of the Damage Caused Un-
justly in the Property of Citizens § 1(1) (Hung.) [hereinafter Act of 1994]. At first, a claim had to be
submitted within 90 days of the enactment of the First Compensation Law on September 14, 1991. See
First Compensation Law, supra note 219, 11 (1). The final date for submission of a claim was then
extended to December 16, 1991. See Act L of 1991 Concerning the Amendment of Act XXV of 1991
On Partial Compensation for Damages Unjustly Caused by the State to Properties of Citizens, in the
Interests of the Settlement of Ownership Relations, art. I (Hung.). Finally, the deadline was pushed
back to Mar. 15, 1994. See Act II of 1994, supra, § 1 (1).
243. First Compensation Law, supra note 219, 10(1).
244. /d.
245. Id. 10(3).
246. See discussion supra Part III(B)(3).
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effective exercise of governmental power to extinguish those rights. The
inherent cross-border nature of claims incident to state succession and of
certain controversies involving regime change necessitates attention to the
power of international institutions or of individual sovereigns to extinguish
rights in order to reinforce comprehensive claims resolution.
A. Executive Power Under US. Law
The U.S. Government has followed a long practice of diverting private
international claims from its regular courts to specialized claims settlement
machinery. The most recent instance, involving claims against Iran, re-
sulted in Supreme Court litigation which reviewed the history and validated
the practice.
After the Iranian government seized hostages at the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran on November 4, 1979, President Carter exercised emergency pow-
ers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA"). 247 President Carter declared a national emergency on Novem-
ber 14, 1979, blocking the removal or transfer of "all property and interests
in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled
entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," delegating to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury authority to implement the freeze. 248 On November 15, 1979, the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a regula-
tion providing that "[u]nless licensed or authorized... any attachment,
judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is
null and void with respect to any property in which on or since [November
14, 1979] there existed an interest of Iran." 249
When the hostages were released on January 20, 1981, the U.S. en-
tered into an agreement brokered by the Algerian government to establish
an Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The stated purpose of the agreement and the
Tribunal was "to terminate all litigation as between the Government of
each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement
and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration." 250 Awards
247. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (Supp. Il 1976)
[hereinafter IEEPA]. The IEEPA states that the President's authority under the Act "may be exercised
to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat." Id. § 1701 (a).
248. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980).
249. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (2003).
250. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665 (1981) (describing stated purpose of the agree-
ment).
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of the Tribunal were "final and binding" and to be enforceable "in the
courts of any nation in accordance with its laws."'25 1 The agreement obli-
gated the U.S. to:
terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims
of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enter-
prises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to pro-
hibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the
termination of such claims through binding arbitration.2 52
The agreement also obligated the U.S. to "bring about the transfer" by
July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets held in this country by American
banks.2 53 "One billion dollars of these assets [was to] be deposited in a
security account in the Bank of England, to the account of the Algerian
Central Bank, and used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by the
[Tribunal].
254
President Carter issued a series of executive orders implementing the
terms of the agreement. 255 These orders revoked all licenses permitting the
exercise of "any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds,
securities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in such assets
acquired subsequent to the blocking order of November 14, 1979; and re-
quired those banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them "to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, to be held or transferred as directed by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
'2 56
Then in 1981, newly inaugurated President Reagan issued an execu-
tive order in which he ratified the Carter executive orders, suspended "all
claims which may be presented to the [Tribunal]," and provided that "such
claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of
the United States. '257 The suspension of any particular claim terminates if
the Tribunal determines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim; claims
are discharged for all purposes when the Tribunal either awards some re-
covery and that amount is paid, or determines that no recovery is due.258
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected chal-
lenges brought by a creditor of the Government of Iran, Iran's atomic en-
ergy agency, and several Iranian banks to the executive orders freezing the
251 Id.
252. Id- (internal quotations omitted) (describing the agreement and the powers of the Tribunal).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (Jan. 19, 1981) [hereinafter Carter
executive orders].
256. Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (Jan. 19, 1981).
257. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 24, 1981).
258. Id. See generally Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665-66 (discussing the executive orders and
the Tribunal's obligations and powers).
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removal or transfer of property of the Government of Iran.2 59 The Court
held that the IEEPA gave the President authority to freeze assets 260 and that
the President had inherent Constitutional power, acquiesced to by the Con-
gress, to suspend judicial enforcement actions in U.S. courts. 26 1 The Court
stated:
Not infrequently in affairs bctween nations, outstanding claims by na-
tionals of one country against the government of another country are
"sources of friction" between the two sovereigns. To resolve these diffi-
culties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of
their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international
agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the govern-
ment of another are established international practice reflecting tradi-
tional international theory. Consistent with that principle, the United
States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims
of its nationals against foreign countries. Though those settlements have
sometimes been made by treaty, there has also been a longstanding prac-
tice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the advice
and consent of the Senate. ... It is clear that the practice of settling
claims continues today. Since 1952, the President has entered into at
least 10 binding settlements with foreign nations, including an S80 mil-
lion settlement with the People's Republic of China.262
The Court noted the enactment of the International Claims Settlement
Act ("ICSA") in 1949,263 which provided for the allocation to U.S. nation-
als of funds received in the course of an executive claims settlement with
Yugoslavia, and established a procedure to distribute funds resulting from
future settlements through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
264
"To achieve these ends Congress created the International Claims Commis-
sion, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and gave it jurisdic-
tion to make final and binding decisions with respect to claims by United
States nationals against settlement funds.
'265
The Court further observed that, "[i]n 1976, Congress authorized the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the merits of claims
by United States nationals against East Germany," and subsequently,
claims against Vietnam. 266 The Court noted:
The constitutional power of the President extends to the settlement of
mutual claims between a foreign government and the United States, at
least when it is an incident to the recognition of that government; and it
259. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688-89.
260. Id. at 675.
261. Id. at 688.
262. Id. at 679-80 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
263. 22 U.S.C. § 1621 etseq. (1976 & Supp. IV).
264. Id.
265. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)).
266. Id. at 681 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 1644b, 1645, 1645a(5)).
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would be unreasonable to circumscribe it to such controversies. The con-
tinued mutual amity between the nation and other powers again and
again depends upon a satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the
necessary power to make such compromises has existed from the earliest
times and been exercised by the foreign offices of all civilized
nations.
267
Although the terms of the executive orders and Treasury regulations
did not require deciding whether the power to freeze assets and suspend
claims pending in jurisidical tribunals extends to purely private claims-
those by natural or juridical persons against other private persons-the
Court's reasoning suggests that the powers would include such claims, as
long as such a broad exercise was justified as necessary in the interest of
U.S. foreign policy.
The Court declined to address the argument that suspension of its
claims constituted a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment
because of the possibility that the Tribunal would provide adequate com-
pensation, supplemented as necessary by a claim for any deficiency under
the Tucker Act.
268
Apart from the specifics of the Tribunal, a statutorily established
claims commission, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,269 has
authority to resolve claims by U.S. nationals against specified govern-
ments, including those of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Italy,
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, China, East Germany, and Viet-
nam.270 Decisions by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission are ex-
empt from judicial review.
27 1
267. Id. at 683 (citing Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951)).
268. Id. at 688-89. At least since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" in 1799, Presidents have
exercised the power to settle claims of U.S. nationals by executive agreement. See R.B. Lillich, The
Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum
Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 837, 844 (1975). In fact, during the period of 1817-1917, "no fewer than
eighty executive agreements were entered into by the United States looking toward the liquidation of
claims of its citizens." WALLACE MCCLURE, tNTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC
PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (1941); see also 14 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1970).
269. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Press Releases and New Developments, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/fcsc/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005)_
270. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-45 (2000).
271. See Am. & Eur. Agencies, Inc. v. Gillilland, 247 F.2d 95, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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B. German, French, British, and EU Counterparts to Dames & Moore
Commentators have suggested that all Western legal systems are
likely to embrace reasoning similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Dames & Moore.
272
C. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
In its resolution pertaining to post-invasion of Iraq, the U.N. Security
Council purports to obligate states to freeze assets belonging to Iraq and to
suspend claims and enforcement proceedings relating to Iraq oil reve-
nues. 273 There is no international mechanism for testing the power of the
Security Council to exercise such a power, other than state recognition. So
far, it appears that states are honoring the freeze and suspension.
V. Kosovo's UNIQUE SITUATION
Claims disputes in Kosovo are characterized by a number of unique-
or at least unusual-features of Kosovo as a constituent unit of the former
Yugoslavia, with ambiguous legal personality within Yugoslavia, subjected
to ten years of exploitation by the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia, and
then a period of international political trusteeship.
2 74
The Yugoslav experience means, first, that some private property was
expropriated by the socialist government after the Second World War; sec-
ond, that much property was held in "social ownership" in SOEs; and third,
that assets owned by the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav state enterprises
were potentially subject to various freezes and trading embargos imposed
by the U.S. and other states incident to the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo.275 Expropriation raises all the issues of claims resolution usually
incident to expropriation in other states.276 Social ownership presents some
272. See Jessica Heslop & Joel Roberto, Property Rights in the Unified Germany: A Constitutional.
Comparative, and International Legal Analysis, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 243, 271-73 (1993) (suggesting that
German constitutional law allows constitutionally protected property claims to be determined through
special mechanisms established through foreign affairs powers of executive and legislative branches).
273. See discussion supra Part lI(B)(2) (describing the post-invasion approach to claims admini-
stration and quoting language of Resolution 1483).
274. See generally Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo
("OSCE"), Property Rights in Kosovo (2002-2003), at http://www.osce.org/doc-
uments/mik/2003/06974_en.pdf (assessing confusion about property rights in Kosovo) [hereinafter
2002-2003 OSCE Property Report].
275. See Proctor & Gamble Cellulose Co. v. Viskoza-Loznica, 33 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (W.D.
Tenn. 1998) (summarizing U.S. presidential executive orders imposing trade prohibitions and asset
freezes); Belgrade v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (summarizing
U.S. Government actions freezing Yugoslav assets and prohibiting trade with Yugoslav entities).
276. See discussion supra Part 111.
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special problems because ownership of SOEs was highly ambiguous. 277
The state retained some attributes of ownership of some assets.
278 Posses-
sion, however, was the right of SOE employees, represented through work-
ers' councils, with municipalities in which SOE assets were located also
having rights and powers resembling those of trustees holding property
rights on behalf of the workers. 279 This murky set of legal relationships was
further complicated by privatization or "transformation" of many SOEs
during the Milosevic period.280
Succession issues are even more complicated in Kosovo and are not
addressed by the Agreement on Succession Issues. 281 Kosovo, formerly an
autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia within Yugoslavia, has
been, since June 10, 1999, under the civil administration of the U.N., oper-
ating through the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"),
backed by a NATO security force called the Kosovo Force ("KFOR").
In Kosovo, conflicting claims to property, such as apartments, exist
between Serbs who left Kosovo after NATO and the U.N. arrived, the in-
temational institutions conducting the civil administration, the provisional
institutions of self-government in Kosovo, Kosovar Albanians, or other
Serbs. Kosovar Albanians have claims to pension assets held in Serbia. A
variety of commercial entities around the world have claims to assets that
were privatized by the Milosevic regime and then renationalized and repri-
vatized through the privatization process under U.N. administration.
282
Sorting all this out is made more difficult by the parallel state run by
the Albanians during the Milosevic regime, when many transfers from
277. See Proctor & Gamble, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 644, 653-54 (involving a suit by a U.S. firm against
Yugoslav SOE, its purchasing agents, and banks issuing letters of credit on its behalf for payment for
raw materials). The court noted and deferred to the Treasury Department presumption that SOEs were
controlled by the Yugoslav government, but found that the bank had been privatized in 1990 and thus
was no longer an SOE. Id.; see also Sablic v. Croatia Line, 719 A.2d 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (suit alleging, among other things, wrongful termination of employment by Croatian SOE).
278. See Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
Yugoslav government retained interest in SOE because proceeds from any sale would be paid into a
government-controlled fund); Proctor & Gamble, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (characterizing SOE as man-
aged by workers councils but owned by state).
279. See generally Belgrade, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (stating that a "socio-political community'-a
subdivision of the state-retained equitable ownership and reversionary property rights in SOE assets).
280. Proctor & Gamble, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 657-58 (explaining the Yugoslav system of privatiza-
tion, in which shares in SOEs were sold, with proceeds paid into "development funds" established by
the state). Privatization also occurred under the auspices of states seceding from Yugoslavia. See Sablic,
719 A.2d at 176-77 (finding former SOE to be controlled by Croation privatization agency under 1992
law on privatization); 2002-2003 OSCE Property Report, supra note 274, at 3-4 (summarizing the
peculiarities of the property rights regime in Kosovo).
281. See discussion supra Part Ill(A)(l).
282. See generally MRAK, supra note 109, at 17 (noting Slovenia's position in London-Club nego-
tiations that "controlled Yugoslav persons" should be excluded as debtor beneficiaries).
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Albanians to Serbs were coerced and many voluntary transfers to Albani-
ans were not recorded, and by the chaotic situation after the NATO bomb-
ing campaign in 1999, when property transfers from Serbs were allegedly
coerced, and in many cases not recorded. In addition, the Serbs, as part of
their ethnic cleansing campaign, deliberately destroyed many formal docu-
ments held by Kosovar Albanians.
Resolution 1244 authorizes both civil and security presences, which
were agreed to by the FRY.283 The resolution requests the Secretary-
General of the U.N. to appoint a "Special Representative" ("Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General" or "SRSG") to control the implementa-
tion of the international civil presence. 284 The resolution authorizes the
SRSG to establish the civil presence in order to:
provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of
Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while es-
tablishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal
life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.
285
Among other things, the SRSG is to perform "basic civilian adminis-
trative functions where and as long as required," 286 to transfer its adminis-
trative responsibilities to "local provisional institutions, ' 287 to facilitate a
political process to determine Kosovo's future status taking into the ac-
count the Rambouillet Accords, 288 and, ultimately, to oversee the transfer
of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions estab-
lished under a political settlement.289 Most significantly in conjunction
with the subject of this Article-the SRSG is authorized to support "the
reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction. '290
On July 25, 1999, the SRSG promulgated UNM1K Regulation 1999/1,
exercising authority under Resolution 1244. Regulation 1999/1 provided,
among other things, that the civil administration-UNMIK-would per-
form its duties under Resolution 1244 by "issue[ing] legislative acts in the




287. Id. 1 (d).
288. Id. 11 (e). The Rambouillet Accords, brokered by the U.S. and signed by representatives of
political- and guerilla-resistance entities in Kosovo, but not by the FRY, envisioned, among other
things, a plebiscite after three years to determine future status- Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999, U.N. Doc. Sf1999/648 (June 7, 1999), at
http://www-state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvorambouillet_text.html.
289. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1, 11 (c).
290. Id. 11 (g).
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form of [UNMIK] regulations."'29 1 UNMIK Regulation 2000/54, which
amended Regulation 1999/1, further provided that UNMIK would "admin-
ister movable or immovable property which is in the territory of Kosovo,
including monies, bank accounts and other assets" as to which UNMIK has
"reasonable and objective grounds to conclude" is "property of, or regis-
tered in the name of, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of
Serbia or any of their organs," 292 or "socially owned property. ' 293 UNMIK
administration of property pursuant to this authority "shall be without
prejudice to the right of any person or entity to assert ownership or other
rights in the property in a competent court in Kosovo, or in a judicial
mechanism to be established by [UNMIK] Regulation."
294
In UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, the SRSG declared that "UNMIK, its
property, funds and assets shall be immune from any legal process."
295
On June 13, 2002, the SRSG established the Kosovo Trust Agency
("KTA" or "the Agency") in UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, explicitly citing
authority under Resolution 1244 and Regulation 1999/1. The KTA was
established as an independent body, possessing "full juridical personality,"
with the capacity to contract, acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and to
sue and be sued in its own name. 296 The KTA reports through the recon-
struction component of the civil administration. 297 The KTA was author-
ized to "administer publicly owned and socially owned enterprises and
related assets within the context of Section 8.1(q) of the Constitutional
Framework." 298 The authority of the KTA expressly extended to "all [e]n-
291. On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 § 4 (July 25, 1999), amended by Amending
UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, as Amended, On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kos-
ovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doec. UNMIK/REG/2000154 (Sept. 27,
2000).
292. UNMIK/REG/2000/54 § 6.1(a).
293. Id. § 6.1 (b).
294. Id. § 6.2.
295. On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kos-
ovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/47 § 3 (Aug. 18,
2000). Section 1 defines "UNMIK" to mean the "international civil presence established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1244... integrating the Interim Civil Administration (United Nations);
Humanitarian Affairs (UNHCR); Institution-building (OSCE) and Reconstruction (EU) components."
Id- § 1.
296. On the Establishment of the Kosovo Trust Agency, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, U.N. Doec. UNMIK/REG/2002/12 § 1 (June 13, 2002).
297. Id. § 12.3(a).
298. Id. § 2.1. The Constitutional Framework was set forth in UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, which
reserved to UNMIK (as distinct from the provisional institutions of self-government set up by that
UNMIK Regulation) "[a]uthority to administer public, state and socially-owned property in accordance
with the relevant UNMIK legislation in force" and to regulate "public and socially-owned enterprises
after having consulted the Economic and Fiscal Council and the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government" established by that UNMIK Regulation. On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional
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terprises and assets within the scope of UNMIK Regulation 2000/63 ...
[e]stablish[ing] an Administrative Department of Trade and Industry," and
UNMIK Regulation 2000/45, providing for self government of municipali-
ties in Kosovo.2
99
The KTA also has authority to take "any action, [with certain excep-
tions] . . . that the Agency considers appropriate to preserve or enhance the
value, viability, or governance" of the enterprises. 300 The authority ex-
pressly includes "[e]ntering into arrangements for the management, recon-
struction or reorganization of [e]nterprises." 30 1 The KTA may establish
subsidiaries and transfer assets to the subsidiaries, 302 restructure an enter-
prise into several enterprises or corporations, 303 contract out part of the
activities of enterprises, 30 4 and initiate bankruptcy proceedings.
305
With respect to SOEs, the KTA, in addition to its basic authority, is
empowered to establish corporate subsidiaries of an SOE and transfer SOE
assets to the subsidiary, to sell shares of the subsidiaries, to liquidate SOEs,
and to dispose of monies and other assets of SOEs. 306 When reorganizing
SOEs, the KTA is authorized to strip the liabilities from assets and to trans-
fer the assets to investors free and clear of claims, and then must place the
money received for the assets from investors selected through an open ten-
der process into a trust, which then is available to satisfy claims adjudicated
by the Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court ("Special Cham-
ber"). 30 7 Twenty percent of the proceeds of a spin-off must be reserved for
employee claims. 308 Eligible employee claimants are those included on lists
for each SOE developed by the "representative body of employees in the
[SOE] concerned, in cooperation with the Federation of Independent Trade
Unions of Kosovo," and submitted to the KTA. 309 The KTA must "review
Self-Government in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doe.
UNMIK/REG/2001/9 § 8.1(q)-(r) (May 15, 2001).
299. UNMIK/REG/2002/12 § 5.5(a)-(b).
300. Id. §6.1.
301. Id. § 6. 1(m).
302. Id. § 6.1(o).
303. Id. § 6.1(q).
304. Id. § 6.1(r).
305. Id. § 6.1(s).
306. Id. § 6.2.
307. See id. §§ 8.1-8.7; see also Operational Policies of the Kosovo Trust Agency, § 5.1.1(a)
(2003) [hereinafter KTA Operating Policies] (describing spin-off as the preferred method, involving
transferring assets and certain liabilities of SOE to the newly incorporated subsidiary of the SOE, which
shall be sold to investors with proceeds deposited into trust accounts to satisfy liabilities remaining with
the SOE, including ownership claims).
308. On the Transformation of the Right of Use to Socially-Owned Immovable Property, U.N.
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2003/1 3 § 10 (May 9, 2003).
309 Id § 10.2
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the list and make such adjustments as it deems necessary to ensure equita-
ble access by all eligible employees to the funds to be distributed.
'310
Section 18 of UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 limits the liability of the
KTA to its assets "plus the unpaid portion of its subscribed capital," and
imposes other limitations on liability. 31 1 This section also waives
UNMIK's immunity for the KTA, but within sharply circumscribed chan-
nels. Unless extended by UNMIK regulation, the KTA's authority expires
three years after its establishment, or June 13, 2005.312
A. Existing Claims Dispute Machinery in Kosovo
The international civil administration in Kosovo has set up two spe-
cialized legal regimes to handle claims with respect to socially-owned
property and residential property. These regimes are incomplete, in that
their scope excludes a significant universe of claims likely to impede
agreement on and implementation of any final status. They also are imper-
fect in their operation. Moreover, other uncertainties in Kosovo are likely
to spawn new claims, including an incomplete property registration sys-
tem, 3 13 imperfect functioning of the regular courts,3 14 and failure of several
levels of executive authority to comply with procedures for expropriating
property. 315 In the aggregate, these difficulties create a situation signifi-
cantly out of compliance with property-rights guarantees under the
ECHR. 3
16
1. Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court
The UNMIK Regulation establishing the KTA provides that "the Spe-
cial Chamber shall have exclusive jurisdiction for all suits against the
[KTA]." 3 17 The Special Chamber also has primary jurisdiction over claims,
including creditor or ownership claims, brought against an enterprise under
310. Id.
311. UNMIK/REG/2002/12 § 18.1.
312. Id. § 31.
313. See 2002-2003 OSCE Property Report, supra note 274, at 10 (concluding that Kosovo's
property registration system does not function effectively to secure property rights or to enable a
smooth transition to a market economy).
314. See id. at 36 (concluding that the regular courts were not functioning effectively to protect
property rights in Kosovo, despite a generally solid legal framework).
315. See id. at 43 (expressing concern that municipal and other authorities in Kosovo were expro-
priating private property without following expropriation procedures).
316. See id. at 2-3 (summarizing property rights under the ECHR).
317. UNMIKiREG/2002/12 § 30.1 (referring to the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Kosovo, established by UNMIK Regulation 2002/13).
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the authority of the KTA, and claims involving rights in property in the
possession or control of an enterprise under the KTA's authority. 318
Procedures before the Special Chamber reflect common concepts of
due process. Special Chamber procedures provide parties with "a meaning-
ful opportunity to have [their claims] adjudicated in an impartial and trans-
parent manner within a reasonable period of time and in accordance with
norms established under the ECHR and having regard to generally accepted
international standards." 319 Decisions of the Special Chamber must be in
writing, specifying reasons for the decision. 320 Parties may be represented
by counsel, including foreign counsel.321 The Special Chamber allows writ-
ten and oral submissions.322 It provides for compulsory process for obtain-
ing testimony 323 and has procedures for obtaining evidence located outside
of Kosovo.324 It allows expert reports, 325 compulsory production of docu-
ments and physical items,326 and site visits.327 All pleadings and supporting
documents must be submitted in English, but additional Serbian or Alba-
nian copies also may be submitted. 328 Discovery is enforceable through
monetary sanctions. 329 Oral as well as written arguments can be made be-
fore the court,330 and the parties have the option of invoking the appeals
process of the Special Chamber. 331 The Special Chamber also has the
power to afford a number of desirable remedies, including injunctions,
332
costs, 333 and monetary compensation equivalent to the lost asset.334
The Special Chamber was designed to be as impartial as possible. A
majority of the judges on the Special Chamber's five judge panel are inter-
318. On the Establishment of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust
Agency Related Matters, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2002/13 § 4.1(c)-(d) (June 13, 2002).
319. Id.§7.
320. Id. § 9.3(b).
321. Implementing UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/13 on the Establishment of a Special Chamber of
the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters, U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/DIR/2003/13 § 21 (June 11, 2003).
322. Id. § 19.
323. UNMIK/REG/2002/13 § 8.
324. UNMIK/DIR/2003/13 § 9.
325. Id. § 40.
326. Id. § 43.
327. Id. § 44.
328. Id. § 22.7.
329. Id. § 43.4.
330. Id. § 32.
331. See id. §§ 55-63.
332. Jd- § 52.




national judges, 335 with an international judge serving as the presiding
judge.336 The Special Chamber has rules ensuring the impartiality of its
judges, which minimizes any concern of local partiality.
337
Claims must be submitted to the Special Chamber within nine months
after the claimant knew or should have known of the decision or other ac-
tion giving rise to the claim by the KTA. 338 Claims only are cognizable by
the Special Chamber when the claimant has given prior notice of the claim
to the KTA.339 Upon request of the KTA, the Special Chamber may sus-
pend any case filed with the Special Chamber for an additional sixty
days.340 In the case of liquidation, creditor claims must be filed with the
Liquidating Committee established by the KTA within sixty days of the
second notification of the liquidation proceedings. 34 1 Within thirty days,
the Liquidation Committee must determine whether to include a claim on
the schedule of claims for the liquidation, and must notify the claimant
within five days after its determination. 342 After a Liquidation Committee
is terminated, the KTA must refer future claims to the Special Chamber.343
The Special Chamber must decide cases within two months after the com-
pletion of proceedings in any case. 344 Protests over lists of employees eli-
gible for 20% of privatization proceeds must be submitted to the Special
Chamber within twenty days of the formal publication of the list, and the
Special Chamber must decide any such protest within forty days of its
submission.34
5
While the Special Chamber was functioning as of March 2004, it got
off to a slow start.346 Because contracts for the first round of privatization
by the KTA were not signed until March 2004, and no liquidations under
KTA auspices had occurred as of the end of March 2004, the earliest that
335. Id. § 3.1.
336 Id. § 3.2.
337. UNMIK/DIR/2003/13 § 4.
338. UNMIKIREG/2002/13 § 6.1.
339. Id. § 6.2 (referring to UNMIK/REG/2002/12 § 30.2, which reads: "The Special Chamber shall
not admit any suit against the Agency unless the claimant submits evidence of having notified the
Chairman of the Board of his intention of filing such suit at least sixty (60) days prior to the actual
filing").
340. UNMIK/REG/2002/12 § 30.2 (the function of the suspenion of proceedings is to facilitate
amicable settlements).
341. KTA Operating Policies, supra note 307, § 7.9.1.
342. Id. § 7.9.2.
343. Id. § 7.9.3.
344. UNMIKiREG/2002/13 § 9.1.
345. UNMIK/REG/2003/13 § 10.6.
346. Property Rights in Kosovo 2002-2003, supra note 274, at 28 (noting that the Special Chamber
was not fully functioning in 2003).
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privatization claims are likely to be decided by the Special Chamber is
early to mid-2005.
Whether the privatization regime in Kosovo represents a partial solu-
tion to the problem of claims resolution in the context of final status deter-
mination or whether it will become yet another source of disputes depends
on the legal status of the privatization institutions under the sovereign im-
munity and act of state doctrines.
The KTA's decisions fall within the scope of the act of state doctrine,
although this proposition is not immune from challenge. The KTA's deci-
sions are those of a state for purposes of the doctrine. The KTA, within its
sphere of delegated authority under UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, exercises
legislative and executive functions. The SRSG retains veto power over
KTA decisions. 34 7 Judicial deference for acts of state extends to duly au-
thorized agents of the sovereign state acting for governmental purposes.
The Court in Underhill v. Hernandez held that the acts of a military
commander in Venezuela were subject to immunity.348 "The immunity of
individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their
own states ... must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling
by paramount force as matter of fact."'349 "[T]hat the acts of the defendant
were the acts of the government of Venezuela ... are not properly the sub-
ject of adjudication in the courts of another government. '350 The Court
broadly extended the protection of the sovereign to all agents acting under
its authority.
The KTA acts as the U.N.'s agent, authorized by UNMIK Regulation
2002/12. The U.N. expressly empowered the KTA to engage in privatiza-
tion activities on its behalf.35 1 Because the KTA is a U.N.-created body that
is granted authority to act on behalf of the Kosovo population, its public
acts share the same sovereign character as if those acts were performed by
the U.N. itself. The KTA's actions likely to be challenged in national court
litigation were authorized by the U.N. and thus fall within the act of state
doctrine.
The Government of Kosovo is not fully recognized on the interna-
tional stage, but this does not affect legal treatment of the acts performed
by the KTA for two reasons: (1) the Government of Kosovo, recognized or
347. UNMIK/REG/2002/12 § 24.3 (authorizing the SRSG to repeal or modify KTA decisions and
to mandate KTA actions).
348. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897).
349. Id. at 252.
350. Id. at 254.
351 tNMIKJREG/2002/12 § 6,2 (authorizing the creation of SOE subsidiaries and the sale of SOE
assets).
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not, is not party to privatization decisions; and (2) as an authorized agent of
the U.N., the KTA is accorded the same sovereign character as its parent.
Because the U.S. has recognized the sovereignty of the U.N. as an interna-
tional body,352 agencies and instrumentalities of the U.N. in Kosovo enjoy
the privilege of comity in U.S. courts.
The act of state doctrine also extends to contract cases. The Second
Circuit held in Hewitt that the act of state doctrine applied to contract ac-
tions involving sovereign entities as parties. 353 And while the Supreme
Court has never squarely addressed whether a contractual breach implicates
the act of state doctrine, lower courts have applied the doctrine to such
cases. 35
4
Even if the activities of the KTA subject to challenge fall within the
commercial activities exception of the FSIA, that does not foreclose judi-
cial deference under the act of state doctrine because the commercial activi-
ties exception is not part of the act of state doctrine. In Dunhill, a majority
of the Court did not accept the idea advanced by four Justices that the act of
state doctrine extends only to governmental acts and not to commercial
ones. The Court stated that "we are in no sense compelled to recognize as
an act of state the purely commercial conduct of foreign governments.
'355
Justice Stevens did not join in this part of the opinion.356 Four dissenting
justices reasoned that even if the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
were adopted (as it subsequently was in the FSIA) "it does not follow that
there should be a commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine.
'357
Subsequently, in Machinists v. Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
observed that "[t]he act of state doctrine is not diluted by the commercial
activity exception which limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While
purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an act of state, cer-
tain seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state considera-
352. Exec. Order No. 9698, It Fed. Reg. 1809 (Feb. 19, 1946).
353. Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 F. 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1918) (suit challenging a contract that diverted
monies allegedly due bondholders).
354. Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,
16-22 (1998). Compare World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1165-
66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (act of state doctrine prevents deciding whether the denial of an export license was
a breach of contract); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp.
1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980) (adjudication of contract rights reflected in arbitration award is nonjusticia-
ble because of act of state doctrine), vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981); with Walter Fuller Air-
craft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1388 (5th Cir. 1992) (act of state
doctrine did not foreclose deciding a breach of contract case because the court need not question foreign
governmental policy decisions).
355. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-98 (1976).
356. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
357. Id. at 725 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tions.' '35 8 The court held that price fixing activity by OPEC fell within the
act of state doctrine.
3 59
The KTA acted to privatize SOEs within Kosovo. While this sort of
activity is undoubtedly intended to promote commerce and the develop-
ment of the institutions of a market economy, the KTA's role in the en-
deavor was not commercial in nature. The KTA assumed a governmental
role in privatizing the enterprises, and it did so with proper authorization by
the U.N. The KTA's discretion in choosing the means of introducing pri-
vate investment, whether commercialization or privatization, and its choice
of investors is a necessary and legitimate exercise of its discretion and
authority.
Even if the KTA's activities are "seemingly commercial," a court is
not foreclosed from applying the act of state doctrine. Given the ultimate
goals the KTA hopes to achieve through privatization and the means it
must use to reach those goals, a U.S. court's second-guessing of those acts
implicates the same policy concerns leading to the act of state doctrine.
Application of the act of state doctrine has always been within the courts'
discretion. When the activities that a court must judge possess certain
commercial characteristics, but still point to greater public objectives as the
KTA's privatization efforts most certainly do, the court should recognize
that applying the act of state doctrine is not only permitted, but also
necessary.
As in the Ninth Circuit OPEC case, granting the relief a litigant is
likely to request from a national court would "in effect amount to an order
from a domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign [the international
civil administration of Kosovo] to alter its chosen means" of privatizing
industry. 360 This is precisely the kind of interference in affairs within the
responsibility of the political branches that the act of state doctrine is meant
to avoid.
Beyond inserting the judiciary into difficult, interrelated, and ulti-
mately political controversies over the scope of U.N. administration of
Kosovo and approaches to privatization, a decision on the merits by a na-
tional court would cripple the U.N.'s, UNMIK's, and the KTA's ability to
build an efficient market economy in postconflict Kosovo. Applying the act
of state doctrine will avoid that result.
358. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, (IAM) v. Org. of the Petroleum Exp.
Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981)-




In Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., the Second Circuit held that the "function
of the court in applying the act of state doctrine is to weigh in balance the
foreign policy interests that favor or disfavor [its] application." 361 "[T]he
doctrine demands a case-by-case analysis of the extent to which in the con-
text of a particular dispute separation of powers concerns are
implicated."
362
In Kosovo, the foreign policy concerns are paramount, unlike in Bigio,
where the only identifiable act of state was decades old and had apparently
been repudiated by the current foreign government. In WMW Machinery,
the court found governmental policy decisions irrelevant to the issue in
suit,363 and in Ampac Group, the court, without much analysis, found the
transactions in dispute to be unquestionably commercial in nature, and not
linked to any Executive Branch objective. 3
64
National courts should follow the example of World Wide Minerals,
Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, in which the court of appeals affirmed ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine to foreclose consideration of a claim
that refusal of an export license breached a contract with the plaintiff365
Evaluating the KTA's decision to privatize rather than to execute contracts
contemplated by the U.N. before its creation would draw national courts
into ruling on the validity of the KTA's governmental decisions.
2. Challenges to the Special Chamber and Privatization Machinery
A number of criticisms have been aimed at the privatization and
claims resolution regimes in Kosovo, especially by Serb interests. While
designers of claims resolution machinery in conjunction with final status
determination need not necessarily accede to these criticisms, it is appro-
priate to take them into account because they will shape the political con-
straints within which any claims machinery must be negotiated.
a. Unauthorized Expropriation
The broadest of the criticisms asserts that the transfer of property in-
terests through the KTA represents an unauthorized deprivation of property
interests. This allegedly occurs at two levels. Most broadly, critics claim
that UNMIK's mandate does not extend to the compulsory transfer of
361. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440,452 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
362. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
363. WMW Machinery, Inc. v. Werkzeugmaschinehandel GMBH, 960 F. Supp. 734, 745
(SD.N.Y. 1997).
364. See Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
365. See World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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property interests such as necessarily occurs when assets are leased to in-
vestors for ninety-nine years through the privatization process. Resolution
1244 authorizes the civil administration established by the Secretary-
General to "[support] the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction."
366
This authority, it is argued, cannot be construed to extend to the com-
pulsory transfer of property interests incident to developing a market econ-
omy. Rather, it is limited to short-term reconstruction of physical assets and
economic stabilization. While the authority granted UNMIK to "[perform]
basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required"
367
may include the power to adjudicate competing property claims, it does not
include the power to conduct a forced sale to a third-party investor. Critics
dispute arguments that broader responsibility to "[promote] the establish-
ment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, '368 to "[organize] and [oversee] the development
of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections,"
369 to
"[perform] basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as
required, ' 370 to "[transfer], as these institutions are established, its adminis-
trative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of
Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activi-
ties, '371 and to "[promote] the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo,"372 in the aggregate,
necessarily implies the power to restructure economic institutions through
rearrangement of property interests, in order to create sustainable economic
prosperity through a market economy.
Critics also argue that the powers of UNMIK should not exceed those
of a "belligerent occupant" under international law, whose power to change
law and institutional arrangements is strictly limited to measures necessary
to protect security of occupying forces and to assure the short-term welfare
of local populations, pending resumption of the government displaced by
the occupation.
373
366. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1, 1 (g).
367. Id. I I l(b).
368. ld. 1 I(a).
369. Id. I I l(c).
370. Id. I (b).
371. Id- 1I (d)-
372. Id. 1 l(a).
373. See Geneva Convention for the Amerlioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armd Forces in the Field, art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Maxine
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But this argument fails to take account of the reality that Kosovo is not
appropriately classified as a belligerent occupant, where the preexisting
sovereign is expected to return intact. Resolution 1244 expressly contem-
plates a political settlement, in terms of final status, that, whatever its form,
will alter preexisting political institutions and the structure of sover-
eignty.3 74 The role of UNMIK is better characterized as a political trustee-
ship, under which UNMIK, as trustee, has the power to restructure property
interests and legal and political institutions whenever justifiable as useful in
protecting and enhancing the interests of the beneficiaries of the trustee-
ship-the people of Kosovo.
375
Under a narrow view of the powers granted by Resolution 1244, the
assumption by UNMIK of "[a]ll legislative and executive authority with
respect to Kosovo, ' 376 and the assumption of plenary power over all "mov-
able or immovable property, including monies, bank accounts, and other
property of, or registered in the name of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via or the Republic of Serbia or any of its organs, which is in the territory
of KoSOVO' ' 3 7 7 is ultra vires, because it exceeds the powers conferred by the
Security Council. Moreover, critics claim that the powers assumed by
UNMIK extend only to state property and not to property in social
ownership.
But the Security Council has, since the issuance of Resolution 1244,
exercised continuous oversight over the U.N.'s administration of Kosovo,
receiving notice of UNMIK regulations and also receiving regular reports
by the Secretary-General and the SRSG, some of which have expressly
referred to privatization of socially-owned assets as a priority, and the ma-
chinery for privatization and claims resolution. Failure by the U.N. Security
Council to take action to limit the exercise of this authority by UNMlK
evidences concurrence by the U.N. Security Council in the view that
UNMIK's power includes the power to privatize through the mechanism
established by UNMIK.
Finally, critics of the privatization regime argue that KTA has acted
ultra vires in interfering with property interests in enterprises outside its
mandate. The KTA has authority only over socially-owned and publicly-
owned enterprises ("POEs") registered or operating in the territory of Kos-
ovo, expressly excluding those lawfully transformed into a different form
Marcus, Humanitarian Intervention Without Borders: Belligerent Occupation or Colonization?, 25
Hous. J. INr'L L. 99, 113 (2002) (summarizing limitations on changes in local law).
374. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1, 1 11 (e).
375. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 391 (explaining concept of political trusteeship).
376. UNMIK/REG/1991/1 § 1(1).
377. Id. § 6.
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of business enterprise. 378 The KTA has, they argue, asserted authority over
enterprises, and sold assets or intends to sell assets belonging to enterprises
that do not qualify as socially- or publicly-owned. Such claims should be
within the jurisdiction of the Special Chamber to resolve, but critics argue
that the power of the Special Chamber should be congruent with that of the
KTA. The Special Chamber has jurisdiction over "[c]hallenges to decisions
or other actions of [the KTA] undertaken pursuant to Regulation No.
2002/12,"379 over "creditor or ownership claims, brought against an Enter-
prise... currently or formerly under the administrative authority of the
[KTA]," 380 and over claims "involving recognition of a right, title or inter-
est in property in the possession or control of [a business enterprise] cur-
rently or formerly under the ... authority of the [KTA]." 38 1 Critics argue
that this grant of jurisdiction to the Special Chamber excludes claims and
challenges outside KTA authority.
b. Denial of Due Process
Even if KTA and Special Chamber authority extends to enterprises
and claims contended to be outside their authority, critics argue that the
procedures used by the KTA and the Special Chamber violate European
and international norms of due process. In particular, they criticize the
management of the KTA as biased because of inadequate Serb representa-
tion on the board and staff. They claim that KTA's operating procedures
fail to assure adequate "due diligence" in classifying enterprises as so-
cially- or publicly-owned and thus within KTA's jurisdiction. They argue
that appointment of judges to the Special Chamber for relatively short
terms of six months and employment of judges as consultants to UNMIK
deprives them of the requisite independence.
c. Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
Critics of the KTA/Special Chamber machinery argue that these sub-
stantive and procedural shortcomings of the privatization process violate
UNMIK's duty under the ECHR, expressly made applicable in Kosovo by
UNMIK.382 Article I of the First Protocol to the Convention guarantees
378. UNMIK/REG/2002/12 §§ 5.1,5.3.
379. UNMIK/REG/2002/13 § 4.1(a).
380. Id.§4.1(c).
381. Id. § 4.1(d).
382. On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/24 § 1.3 (Dec. 12, 1999) (expressly adopting the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as part of applicable law in Kosovo).
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"peaceful enjoyment of possessions," 383 and this provision has been inter-
preted by the European Court of Human Rights to cover cases of privatiza-
tion and nationalization. States have wide latitude to determine state
interests that justify alteration of property relationships, but the European
Court of Human Rights has held that states must provide access to fair
judicial procedures to determine the compensation due for interference with
property rights.
3. Possible Solutions to Challenges to Privatization Machinery
Overreaction to criticisms of the KTA and the Special Chamber re-
sulted in a number of roadblocks to privatization. After a very promising
start, privatization efforts were complicated by new EU personnel, begin-
ning with a freeze in October 2003, and followed by an effort to substitute
illogical operational policies that would not allow investors to obtain clear
title to assets. The result was significant political controversy, pitting the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government ("PISG") and the Kosovar
trade union organization against the new management of the KTA. This
resulted in paralysis of the privatization machinery well into 2004.
Hopefully, these short-term controversies can be resolved in a way
that will allow privatization to continue, with disputes over the extent of
KTA and Special Chamber authority presented for adjudication in the Spe-
cial Chamber.
In the longer run, however, a strategy must be adopted that provides
for a more robust and comprehensive mechanism for resolution of claims
associated with SOEs, POEs and their management, liquidation, and priva-
tization. Any viable strategy must include features that respond to the criti-
cisms of the KTA/Special Chamber machinery.
Such a strategy also must encompass the universe of housing claims
within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Property Directorate 384 and the
other types of claims entirely outside the scope of the KTA/Special Cham-
ber and Housing Property Directorate institutions.
383 Protocol I of the ECHR says:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
Protocol 1, art. 1, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 18, 1954,
213 U.N.T.S. 262, available at http://www.hri.org/does/ECHR50.html#Pl.
384. See discussion infra Part V(A)(4).
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4. Housing and Property Directorate
UNMIK established a Housing and Property Directorate ("Director-
ate") and a Housing and Property Claims Commission ("Commission") in
1999.385 The Directorate was empowered to register claims by natural per-
sons to residential property involving discriminatory revocation of rights
subsequent to March 1989,386 or deprivation of possession occurring before
1999. 387 The Commission was empowered to "settle private non-
commercial disputes concerning residential property referred to it by the
Directorate until the Special Representative of the Secretary-General de-
termines that local courts are able to carry out the functions entrusted to the
Commission. ' 388 The Commission is composed of one panel of two inter-
national and one local members, who are all "experts in the field of housing
and property law and competent to hold judicial office.' '389
Claims were required to be submitted to the Commission by Decem-
ber 1, 2001.390 Decisions are enforceable by eviction by an officer of the
Directorate and law enforcement authorities. 391
By the end of 2003, more than 25,000 claims had been presented to
the Commission and about half had been resolved.392 Even so, the Com-
mission was not fully performing its mission because of confusion about
overlapping jurisdiction and impediments to enforcement of its
decisions. 39
3
The most serious limitation on the effectiveness of the Commission is
uncertainty as to the legal regime for residential property claims not pre-
sented to the Commission by the December 2001 deadline.
B. Solving Problems Relating to Existing Machinery
Elements of a comprehensive claims resolution strategy for Kosovo
can take one of three basic approaches to claims and challenges associated
385. On the Establishment of the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property
Claims Commission, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/1999/23 §§ 1-2 (Nov. 15, 1999).
386. Id. § 1.2(a).
387- Id. § 1.2(c).
388. Id. § 2.1.
389. Id. § 2.2.
390. On Residential Property Claims and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Housing and
Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc- UNMIK/REG/2000/60 § 3.2 (Oct. 31,2000).
391. Id- § 13.4.
392. See 2002-2003 OSCE Property Report, supra note 274, at 15.
393. Id. at 12-24 (concluding that the Directorate and the Commission were not yet functioning
effectively to protect residential property rights in Kosovo).
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with privatization and residential housing: ratify KTA, Special Chamber,
and Directorate decisions, while reinforcing and extending the existing
machinery; replace the existing machinery with a new set of claims resolu-
tion institutions with broader jurisdiction; or provide new mechanisms for
review of KTA, Special Chamber, and Directorate decisions.
Choosing among these approaches will necessarily involve a political
resolution of the controversies incident to each existing system. At the
same time, however, the process of designing and erecting new claims
resolution machinery should not interrupt progress in economic transforma-
tion, or introduce new uncertainties for investors or claimants. The best
approach would be one that allows decisions made through the existing
institutions to stand, ratifying them in general, while affording narrow
grounds for those aggrieved by those decisions to seek compensation
through new mechanisms.
In any event, a comprehensive claims resolution system must address
the significant subset of claims outside the jurisdiction of the KTA, the
Special Chamber, and the Directorate. These include claims for interfer-
ence with property interests not associated with SOEs or POEs, pension
claims by pension beneficiaries in Kosovo, 394 claims by any new govern-
ment of Kosovo for misappropriation of public funds by Serbia, claims for
personal injury and property damage associated with the Milosevic regime
and its ethnic cleansing activities (mostly Kosovar Albanian claims) and
with the NATO intervention (mostly Serb claims), and claims by Serbia for
recovery or offset of funds invested in enterprises and infrastructure in
Kosovo.
VI. PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR CLAIMS RELATING TO Kosovo
If Kosovo (or UNMIK as political trustee) and Serbia-Montenegro
reach an agreement on claims resolution, the two entities could agree on a
mechanism resembling the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Issues may arise
about the power of the two signatories to alter legal relations involving
other states or citizens of other states.
If Kosovo and Serbia-Montenegro are unable to reach agreement, two
basic possibilities exist for orderly claims resolution. The U.N. Security
Council could mandate a process for resolving claims. Alternatively, credi-
tors could cooperate in "the shadow of the law" (a very dim shadow, given
the paucity of clear law on the subject) in a manner resembling that which
394. Arguably some such claims may represent creditor claims against SOEs and POEs, which can
be partially satisfied by the funds generated by privatization and liquidation of SOE and POE assets.
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occurred in connection with the breakup of the Soviet Union, or in the
nineteenth century 395 before the first federal bankruptcy statute was en-
acted in 1898.396 The literature on game theory and the prisoner's dilemma
in the context of international bankruptcy 397 suggests that such cooperation
would be unlikely and fragile, if it occurred at all.
Claims relating to Kosovo present a less daunting challenge to the in-
ternational legal system than efforts to develop a comprehensive global
system for handling international bankruptcies or a global system for ad-
justing investment disputes; fewer players are involved, and an ad hoc
mechanism rather than a permanent one will suffice. Accordingly, any
useful evaluation of the possibilities for Kosovo claims should begin with
an identification of the key players, both state players and private stake-
holders. State players are those in which Kosovar or Serbian assets are
located, or in which claimants to property in Kosovo are located. Switzer-
land, Germany, France, Great Britain, the U.S., Albania, states formerly a
part of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Italy, and Greece probably account
for the lion's share.
A second, potentially simplifying, inquiry relates to the magnitude of
available assets, compared to the magnitude of total claims. The Milosevic
regime in Yugoslavia is widely viewed as having dissipated most of the
assets owned by the Yugoslav state. If the assets are de minimis, then so-
phisticated claimants are unlikely to invest substantial amounts of energy in
aggressive battles over claims resolution.
395. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1317, 1337-38 (2002) (proposing equity receivership as model for creditor cooperation when states
default on bonds); Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison
of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405, 427
(1999) (noting that creditors often cooperated with debtors to avoid liquidation through equity receiver-
ship).
396. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat.
840 (1938). The Bankruptcy Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). See Adam J. Wiensch, Note,
The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831
(1991) (describing the history of U.S. bankruptcy law); John Fabian Witt, Review Essay, Narrating
Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 303 (2003) (describing the short-lived efforts to enact
federal bankruptcy law in the first half of nineteenth century); Mark Bradshaw, Note, The Role of
Politics and Economics in Early American Bankruptcy Law, 18 WHITTER L. REV. 739 (1997) (same).
397. See. e.g., Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31
(2001) (arguing that game theory demonstrates infeasibility of broad cooperation in international bank-
ruptcies and challenging the proponents of the "universalist" approach to international bankruptcy, in
which the law of the home state of the bankrupt governs, even when assets are located in other states).
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A. Specific Principles to Guide the Design of a Claims Resolution System
1. Even though recognition of Kosovo as a new state, separate from Ser-
bia may not meet the usual prerequisites for dissolution of the state of Ser-
bia, the dissolution model in the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues
should be followed.
Were Kosovo to become independent of Serbia, succession issues
would be addressed in a slightly different context from that applicable to
the independent republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia,
although the pattern set by the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Is-
sues398 would be difficult to avoid as the model for Kosovo. The principal
difference is that Yugoslavia was treated as a case of dissolution rather than
continuation, 399 while the secession of Kosovo more likely would be
treated as a case of continuation. Kosovo was an autonomous province of
the Republic of Serbia, not a republic within Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the
relevant state from which Kosovo would secede is Serbia, not Yugoslavia
itself. Therefore, the conclusion that Yugoslavia dissolved does not guaran-
tee that Kosovo would be treated as a successor state to Yugoslavia under
the dissolution principle, rather than a newly independent state, while the
continuation state of Serbia retains the preexisting legal personality. The
main implication of treating the withdrawal of Kosovo as a case of con-
tinuation rather than dissolution is that Serbia would retain all of the assets
of the predecessor state under customary international law.
There is a counterargument, based on Kosovo's 1991 declaration of
independence, which predated the declarations of independence by Slove-
nia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia. If that declaration of independence is
accorded international recognition retrospectively, it would be more plausi-
ble to treat Kosovo as a successor state to the former Yugoslavia, with enti-
tlements to assets and responsibilities for debts determined under the
Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues should it become a signatory.
Whether the other signatories would accept such an arrangement is, of
course, yet to be determined.
398. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1).
399. See discussion supra Part II(B) (explaining difference between succession and continuation in
international law).
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2. Kosovo should accept responsibility for the allocated portion of Yugo-
slav and Serbian debt-debt directly associated with projects and other
benefits in the territory of Kosovo.
This principle is appropriate so that the claims resolution strategy for
Kosovo can follow the basic pattern set by other independent constituent
units of the former Yugoslavia. Any economic disadvantage to Kosovo
from application of this principle can be mitigated by appropriate appor-
tionment of Serbian assets, increased by allowances for corruption and
waste.
400
3. March 22, 1989, should be used for determining debt and asset values
to be apportioned to the states of Serbia and Kosovo.
Adopting the same date as that used to determine applicable law under
UNMIK administration simplifies claims administration and avoids prob-
lems associated with trying to frame some aggregate method for dealing
with the discriminatory Milosevic regime and the parallel system.
4. Kosovo should be entitled to the same percentage of Yugoslav assets
as the percentage of Yugoslav debt apportioned to it.
No apparent reason exists for adopting different formulas for equitable
allocation of assets and debt not readily linked to particular territory, per-
sons, or enterprises.
5. An adjustment should be made for "waste" by the former Yugoslav
regime.
The adjustment for waste should include losses due to corruption and
expenditures for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Serbia-Montenegro should be
required to account for assets that have been spent and for military assets
that have been destroyed or rendered obsolete since the appropriate date for
dissolution.
401
6. Serbia-Montenegro should be entitled to an adjustment for damage
resulting from the NATO bombing campaign or the Kosovo Liberation
Army insurgency.
It will be politically difficult to arrive at an agreement that charges
Serbia with dissipation of assets associated with systemic human rights
400. See discussion infra Part VI(A)(5).
401. See Stani6, supra note 109, at 771.
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abuses and armed conflict without symmetrical treatment of dissipation
resulting from opposing armed conflict.
7. A "peace conference" approach is more likely to be efficacious than a
"direct negotiations" approach.
While direct negotiations were effective in resolving most private
claims associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the seces-
sion of the republics from Yugoslavia, such an approach is far less likely to
work in the case of Kosovo because of legal uncertainty associated with the
periods of parallel government, Serb exploitation, and international admini-
stration. Moreover, a peace conference approach is inevitable to resolve
final status.
8. The PISG should negotiate on behalf of Kosovo, with UNMIK partici-
pation and oversight.
No system for claims resolution will be viable unless it is accepted by
locally accountable political institutions in Kosovo. The most efficient way
to achieve such acceptance is to empower the PISG to participate directly
in negotiations over claims resolution. Formal concerns about UNMIK's
"reserved powers" can be accommodated adequately by allowing UNMIK
participation and oversight, with periodic reporting to the U.N. Security
Council by both the PISG and the SRSG.
9. The claims resolution system should include an adequate system for
identifying assets available to satisfy claims and subjecting them to the
automatic stay.
The best way to assure appropriate disclosure of the assets and liabili-
ties subject to any claims resolution system is to empowei a claims resolu-
tion institution to undertake investigations and audits, reinforced by an
obligation for states in which assets may be located to command coopera-
tion by legal and natural persons subject to their sovereignty. 40 2 The obliga-
tions for state cooperation expressed in Resolution 1483 pertaining to Iraq
are good models. 403
402. See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 208 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999) (without disclosure, the
"basic system of marshalling of assets" in the resulting distribution of proceeds to creditors in bank-
ruptcy proceedings would be an impossible task); In re Estate of Barsanti, 773 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming injunction was necessary for marshalling of assets in probate proceed-
ing); Kreta Shipping, S.A. v. Preussag Int'l Steel Corp., 192 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (a judicial order
to marshall assets is appropriate in admiralty proceeding only when fund is inadequate to pay all claim-
ants in full (citing Petition of Texas Co., 213 F.2d 479, 482 (2d Cit. 1954))).
403. See discussion supra Part Ill(B)(2).
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10. A fund must be established to pay claims, financed by Serbian state
revenues, Kosovar state revenues, and the international community.
It is likely that claims will far exceed available assets in value. In or-
der for a claims resolution system to be meaningful in such a situation
some sort of fund must be established to satisfy claims, as in the case of
privatization in Kosovo, 404 and the claims resolution systems for Iran,
405
Iraq,406 and the Holocaust.407 A fund can be financed by identified assets-
which represents a way of sequestering those assets-from streams of pub-
lic revenues proportional to negotiated responsibility for dissipation of
assets, 408 and from national and international governmental subsidies as
necessary.
11. An automatic stay should be imposed as soon as the claims resolution
system is adopted.
Any dispute resolution mechanism intended to include competing
claims for the same asset and any mechanism intended to assure the pri-
macy of its decisions with respect to claims must include some kind of
automatic stay rule.40 9 The automatic stay in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
operates to suspend any "judicial, administrative, or other action or pro-
ceeding against the debtor" once a petition is filed. 4 10 Although the extra-
territorial effect of the automatic stay in U.S. bankruptcy law is
controversial, 411 this issue is only one of many relating to coordination of
transborder bankruptcies.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens in U.S. courts and in the courts
of other common law countries, 4 12 such as England,4 13 Scotland, Can-
404. See discussion supra Part V.
405. See discussion supra Part ItI(B)(1).
406. See discussion supra Part III(B)(2).
407. See discussion supra Part IfI(B)(3).
408. See discussion supra Part VI(A)(5)-(6).
409. The UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide refers to this as the "[p]rotection of the assets of the
debtor against the actions of creditors, the debtor itself and the insolvency representative, and where the
protective measures apply to secured creditors, the manner in which the economic value of the security
interest will be protected during the insolvency proceedings." UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part
I, supra note 61, 28(d). The UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide considers the desirable attributes of
an automatic stay. UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide Part II, supra note 75, 176-219.
410. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000).
411. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 965-66 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming injunctions against
filings in foreign receivership proceeding).
412. The doctrine permits discretionary refusal of jurisdiction in all common law countries, but the
standards for its application differ from country to country.
413. See Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
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ada,4 14 and Australia, obligates a court hearing a controversy to dismiss a
case that more properly should be heard in another tribunal. The doctrine is
unavailable in civil law countries because it violates strict jurisdictional
rules under procedure codes.4 15 Even in those countries, however, a related
doctrine, lis pendens, allows staying an action in favor of a similar action
already pending in the court of another state, 416 presumably including
courts established by a political trustee.
Absent a treaty binding all states in which parallel proceedings might
be attempted or a U.N. Security Council resolution similar to Resolution
1483,417 an automatic stay provision in a claims resolution regime for Kos-
ovo, while desirable, cannot do more than automatic stay provisions in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code and counterparts in other national bankruptcy
regimes.
12. Private claims as well as intergovernmental claims should be included.
A significant part of the universe of claims associated with Kosovo are
private, rather than governmental claims. Excluding such claims would
undermine the political utility of any claims resolution system.
13. Private claimants should have standing to present claims directly to
claims resolution tribunals.
Forcing private claims to be presented only through governments or
international organizations, as in the case of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu-
nal,4 18 affords the possible benefit of an initial, national law screening
mechanism. But the uncertainties of the past and present legal regimes in
Kosovo vitiate any such benefit in Kosovo, where many of the likely
claimants are located. Allowing private presentation of claims, however,
455, 481-82 (1994) (characterizing the English version of the forum non conveniens doctrine as being
more focused on identifying the best forum).
414. See Donald J. Carney, Forum Non Conveniens in the United States and Canada, 3 BUFF_ J.
INT'L L. 117, 126 (1996) (describing the Canadian doctrine as first determining whether a better forum
exists for trying the case, and second, determining whether the plaintiff would be disadvantaged by
dismissal); id. at 133 (procedural law changes that would disadvantage a plaintiff would bar a dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds in Canada).
415- Reus, supra note 413, at 489 (giving reasons for hostility to the doctrine of forum non conven-
tens by civil law jurists); id. at 495-502 (discussing the controversy over the doctrine in Germany and
other civil law systems).
416. See Martine Stfickelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference:
The Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949 (2001) (suggesting that eventual Hague convention on international
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement will contain some type offorum non conveniens provision).
417. See discussion supra Part III(B)(2).
418. See discussion supra Part llI(B)(1).
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necessitates some sort of legal aid or simplified resolution process, as the
Special Chamber has learned.
4 19
14. A deadline of two years after establishment of the claims resolution
system should be imposed.
Any claims resolution system is unacceptably open-ended unless it ex-
tinguishes claims not presented by a certain date. A two-year deadline
should be adequate and is commensurate with deadlines imposed in all of
the systems considered in this Article.
15. Valuation techniques should be those used in other recent claims reso-
lution systems.
Valuation of assets and claims is a major challenge for any dispute
resolution system. Controversies and the burden on decisionmakers can be
reduced by following standard practices in other models.
16. Decisions on private claims should be insulated from collateral attack
under appropriate recognition and enforcement rules.
Any system for reallocating legal rights in assets is ineffective unless
the legal authorities of the place where the assets are located are willing
and able to compel one in physical control of the assets to respect the deci-
sions made in the reallocation process. In part this depends on formal rules
for recognition and enforcement of judgments under private international
law. It also depends on the effectiveness of the legal system where the as-
sets are located. Formal recognition and the issuance of formal enforcement
or execution orders are of little value if there is no one who can apply coer-
cive power to overcome resistance to the orders.
420
There is no multilateral convention on jurisdiction of national courts
or enforcement of foreign judgments, despite a continuing effort by the
Hague Conference on Private International Law to negotiate a "convention
on international jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters." 42 1 Private international law, 422 supplemented by European treaty
law,423 provides a starting point for obligating all states to respect judg-
419 See discussion supra Part V(A)(I).
420. See generally Alvarez & Park, supra note 98 (evaluating NAFTA Chapter II and analyzing
legal bases for enforcing arbitration decisions on Chapter 11).
421. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Works in Progress. Judgements, at
http:i/www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=4 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
422. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 13,
§§ 481-82 (reviewing common law criteria for enforcement of foreign judgments).
423- See discussion supra Part I(C).
2005]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ments emerging from the Kosovo claims dispute resolution system under
criteria that discourage relitigation of the merits.
Acceptable levels -of finality, however, necessitate a U.N. Security
Council resolution, or a broad multilateral treaty, obligating member states
or signatory states to take steps under national law to ensure recognition
and enforcement of Kosovo claims resolution decisions, and to insulate
them from collateral attack.
17. Claims should be tradable in the private marketplace before and after
they are presented to any claims resolution tribunal.
Any mechanism for claims resolution should make it easy for claim-
ants to trade their claims to persons who may be willing to buy them, en-
hancing the ability of the market to provide part of the solution. Some of
the problems arising with voucher systems for privatization424 should be
avoidable in the case of Kosovo because of better general awareness of
what private claims are worth.
B. Composition of the Tribunal
Several models for constituting a Kosovo claims tribunal are avail-
able. One model is that used for the Special Chamber of the Kosovo Su-
preme Court. The SRSG designates five members of the Kosovo Supreme
Court, three international judges, one of whom serves as presiding judge of
the Special Chamber, and two judges who are residents of Kosovo. 425 This
approach suffers from the defect that Serb interests are unlikely to accept it
as legitimate.
The structure and membership of a Kosovo claims tribunal also can
draw upon the models of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the UNCC.
The Tribunal has nine members, although the U.S. and Iran can agree on a
greater number of members, in multiples of three. 426 Each government
appoints one-third of the members. The partisan members thus appointed
name the remainder of the members and designate a President of the Tribu-
nal from among them. The tribunal sits en banc or in panels of three as
determined by the President.
The UNCC has a Governing Council and Commissioners, who assess
losses and recommend compensation to the Governing Council.427 The
424. See discussion supra Part Ill(A)(3).
425. UNMIK/REG/2002/13 § 3.1.
426. See supra Part Ill(B)(I).
427. United Nations Compensation Commission, The Commissioners, at blp:#www.tnog.-
ch/uncc/commiss.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
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Governing Council comprises the members of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil. 428 Commissioners are international jurists selected for their integrity,
experience, and expertise in such areas as law, accounting, loss adjustment,
assessment of environmental damage, and engineering.429 Fifty-nine com-
missioners had been appointed as of April 2002 representing forty different
nationalities.430 Commissioners are selected by the Executive Secretary
from a register maintained by the Secretary-General, subject to approval by
the Governing Council. 431 Commissioners sit in panels of three, each spe-
cializing in a particular type of claim.
432
The composition of the Tribunal is less apparently political than that
of the UNCC, inasmuch as the work of the Tribunal is not overseen by state
representatives who have other diplomatic functions.
The most satisfactory approach is to combine features of the Tribunal
and the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). The Kosovo Claims
"Tribunal" itself should comprise seven members, two selected by the gov-
ernment of Serbia, two selected by the government of Kosovo, two selected
by the SRSG to represent the interests of claimants and asset holders in
other states, and one selected by the Presiding Judge of the International
Court of Justice. The Kosovo Claims Tribunal would consider and accept,
reject, or modify recommendations submitted by commissioners, who
would actually hear claims. Commissioners would be assigned from a ros-
ter developed by the ICC. The Kosovo Claims Tribunal would have the
power to adopt rules of procedure.
Involvement by the International Court of Justice and by the ICC is in-
tended to link the Kosovo Claims Tribunal more closely to the commercial
community than might be the case if it were entirely defined by political
bodies of the U.N. The role of the governments of Kosovo and Serbia
would be less than in the case of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal because the
Kosovo Claims Tribunal, unlike the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, will hear claims
involving nationals of third states.
428. United Nations Compensation Commission, The Governing Council, at http://www.unog.-
ch/uncc/governin.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
429. Id.
430. United Nations Compensation Conmission, supra note 427.
431. Id.
432. Id.
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